CLAIM NO. E600536
RICHARD BENTLEY, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. RINECO CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT and INSURANCE COMPANY-STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, INSURANCE CARRIER, RESPONDENT
Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED DECEMBER 5, 1996
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE DEWEY MOORE, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Respondents represented by the HONORABLE FRANK NEWELL, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
[1] ORDER
[2] This matter comes before the Full Commission on the claimant’s “motion for order granting an additional period of temporary total disability benefits and directing that respondents timely pay medical benefits”. After careful consideration of the claimant’s motion, the respondents’ response thereto, and all other matters properly before the Commission, we find that the claimant’s motion must be denied.
[3] The claimant sustained an admittedly compensable low back injury on April 17, 1995, while employed as a welder by the respondent. The claimant returned to light duty and then regular duty for the respondent until he quit in August of 1995, to open a welding business with a partner. The claimant remained in business for four or five months then went to work as a construction laborer. The claimant quit that job on April 14, 1996, after his physician, Dr. Gilliam, placed the claimant on work restrictions inconsistent with the physical requirements of a construction laborer. The claimant filed the present claim for additional temporary total disability beginning April 15, 1996, contending that he remained within his healing period on April 14, 1996, and was temporarily totally disabled from work after April 14, 1996.
[4] A hearing was held before an administrative law judge on the claimant’s claim on July 8, 1996. In an opinion and order filed on September 27, 1996, the administrative law judge found that the respondents are responsible for any outstanding medical expenses related to treatment and referrals provided by Dr. Gilliam, and the administrative law judge found that the respondents are liable for any reasonably necessary future medical treatment provided by Dr. Gilliam. However, the administrative law judge found that the claimant failed to prove that he is entitled to additional temporary total disability compensation. In addition, the administrative law judge found that the claimant’s entitlement to future indemnity benefits requires further development of the medical evidence and is by necessity reserved.
[5] On October 24, 1996, the claimant’s attorney filed a timely notice of appeal of the administrative law judge’s opinion and order filed on September 27, 1996, and the claimant’s attorney also filed on that date the present motion before the Commission. The claimant’s attorney has attached a number of documents to his motion including medical reports from Dr. Gilliam dated June 17, 1996, August 26, 1996, and September 11, 1996, medical reports from Dr. Jeff Ketcham dated August 13, 1996, and September 16, 1996, and a bill dated October 1, 1996, indicating that services provided to the claimant by Arkansas Anesthesia on April 19, 1996, remain unpaid as of October 1, 1996. The claimant asserts that the proffered documents indicate that the claimant is entitled to additional temporary total disability compensation beginning on June 14, 1996, and continuing to a date yet to be determined.
[6] With regard to the claimant’s motion for an order to direct respondents to timely pay medical benefits, we note that the respondents did not appeal the administrative law judge’s decision finding that the respondents are liable for the past medical services and referrals provided by Dr. Gilliam, as well as all future medical treatment directed by Dr. Gilliam that is reasonably necessary for treatment of the claimant’s compensable injury. Because the respondents did not file an appeal of the administrative law judge’s decision, the administrative law judge’s decision with regard to the respondents’ liability for medical expenses is now a final order of the Commission. Nevertheless, we also note that the administrative law filed his decision on September 27, 1996, and the only medical bill proffered by the claimant in support of his motion for an order directing respondents to timely pay medical benefits is a bill which was generated on October 1, 1996, only four days after the administrative law judge’s decision was filed. Therefore, after consideration of the claimant’s motion, and the only relevant evidence currently before the Commission, we find that the claimant has failed to show that the respondents have acted untimely in complying with the award of medical benefits contained in the administrative law judge’s September 27, 1996, opinion and order simply because the claimant received a statement dated October 1, 1996, indicating that a prior medical treatment remained unpaid.
[7] With regard to the claimant’s motion for an order granting an additional period of temporary disability benefits, the claimant essentially asserts in his motion and brief in support that, when Dr. Gilliam placed the claimant in off-work status on June 14, 1996, the claimant became disabled entitling the claimant to a period of additional temporary disability compensation beginning on that date. Notably, the claimant’s assertion in his motion, that he became disabled on June 14, 1996, is somewhat inconsistent with his contention at the hearing, that he remained within his healing period and entitled to additional temporary disability compensation beginning on April 15, 1996.
[8] The claimant’s October 24, 1996, motion for an order granting an additional period of temporary total disability benefits beginning June 14, 1996, is in substance a new claim based on essentially different allegations than those contentions asserted at the hearing. However, we find that this new claim is premature at this time in light of the claimant’s pending appeal before the Full Commission on a claim wherein he asserts that he remained within his healing period and incapacitated to earn wages after April 14, 1996. In this regard, we note that, if we reverse the decision of the administrative law judge and find that the claimant has met his burden of proof in the claim on appeal, then the claimant will be entitled to an award of additional temporary disability compensation for a potentially longer period of disability (beginning on April 15, 1996) than the period of disability asserted in his motion (beginning on June 14, 1996).
[9] In addition, we note that the claimant indicated at the hearing held on July 8, 1996, that he was ready to proceed exclusively on those issues contained in the administrative law judge’s pre-hearing order filed on June 5, 1996. The administrative law judge’s pre-hearing order does not contain any contention that the claimant re-entered his healing period on June 14, 1996. To the contrary, the pre-hearing order states that the claimant contends in the claim currently on appeal that his healing period had not ended on April 14, 1996, and that he was therefore entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits beginning April 15, 1996. In this regard, we find that the parties are bound on appeal to those issues developed at the hearing below. In addition, we find that the claimant’s motion for additional temporary total disability compensation beginning on June 14, 1996, presents additional issues that were not within the scope of the issues agreed to by the parties at the hearing below in the claim currently on appeal.
[10] Accordingly, for the reasons discussed herein, we find that the claimant’s motion for order granting an additional period of temporary total disability benefits and directing that respondents timely pay medical benefits must be, and hereby is, denied.
[11] IT IS SO ORDERED.
JAMES W. DANIEL, Chairman ALICE L. HOLCOMB, Commissioner
[12] Commissioner Humphrey concurs.
