CLAIM NOS. D812325 AND E009711
SUSAN JOYCE CAERY, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. HELENA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT, and THE GUARANTY FUND, INSURANCE CARRIER, RESPONDENT
Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED JUNE 19, 1996
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE CHARLES P. ALLEN, Attorney at Law, West Helena, Arkansas.
Respondents represented by the HONORABLE SCOTT G. LAUCK, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Reversed.
[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] The respondents appeal an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on May 10, 1995. In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge found that this claim is not barred by the statute of limitations. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that the statute of limitations bars this claim. Therefore, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision must be reversed.
[3] The claimant sustained a compensable injury in 1988, but she did not begin losing time from work until January of 1990. The respondents controverted her entitlement to additional benefits, and a hearing was held on February 26, 1991. As a result of this hearing, the administrative law judge filed an opinion and order on May 1, 1991, and the Full Commission filed an opinion and order affirming the administrative law judge’s decision on October 29, 1991. No appeal was taken from the Full Commission’s decision.
[4] The statute of limitations for the filing of claims for additional compensation is set forth in Ark. Code Ann. §
11-9-704(b) (1987). This subsection provides that claims for “additional compensation shall be barred unless filed with the commission within one (1) year from the date of the last payment of compensation or two (2) years from the date of the injury, whichever is greater.” The furnishing of medical treatment constitutes compensation for the purposes of this statute, and it is the furnishing of medical treatment, not the actual payment for those services, which constitutes the payment of compensation for the purposes of this statute. Heflin v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.,
195 Ark. 244,
424 S.W.2d 365 (1969); Cheshire v. Foam Molding,
37 Ark. App. 78,
822 S.W.2d 412 (1992).
[5] In the present claim, the parties have stipulated that the last payment of compensation occurred on September 1, 1992, when the claimant received medical treatment. However, the claimant contends that his attorney sent a letter to the Commission dated May 10, 1991, prior to the time that the Full Commission filed its opinion and order, requesting a temporary hearing, and the claimant contends that this letter constitutes a claim which tolls the statute of limitations. In this regard, correspondence with the Commission may constitute a claim for additional benefits if the correspondence identifies the claimant, indicates that a compensable injury has occurred, and conveys the idea that compensation is expected. Cook v. Southwestern BellTelephone Co.,
21 Ark. App. 29,
727 S.W.2d 862 (1987);Garrett v. Sears, Roebuck Company,
43 Ark. App. 37,
858 S.W.2d 146 (1993).
[6] In the present claim, we find that it is not necessary for us to consider whether the May 10, 1991 letter purportedly sent by the claimant’s attorney to the Commission is sufficient to constitute a claim, for we find that the statute of limitations would bar this claim even if the May 10, 1991, letter found in the record constitutes a properly filed claim. A timely filed claim for additional benefits tolls the statute of limitations only until a final decision resolves all issues included in the claim. BennieBarker v. National Transportation, Full Workers’ Compensation Commission, Aug. 19, 1993 (Claim No.
D803687). It appears that the benefits sought by the claimant in the May 10, 1991 letter were included in the benefits being considered by the Commission at the time the letter was purportedly filed and which were finally decided in the October 29, 1991, decision of the Commission. Therefore, we find that the statute of limitations commenced running again when the Full Commission’s decision became final. It appears that the next correspondence from the claimant which could possibly be considered a claim was not sent to the Commission until September 22, 1993, well over one year after the stipulated date of the last payment of compensation. Consequently, since the claimant did not file a claim for compensation until over one year from the last payment of compensation, we find that this claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
[7] Furthermore, we point out that the copy of the May 10, 1991, letter which is in the record before us does not contain any markings to indicate that it was in fact received by the Commission, and we have been unable to locate the letter in the Commission’s file. Therefore, we find that the preponderance of the evidence does not establish that the letter was ever filed with the Commission. Thus, we also find that the preponderance of the evidence fails to establish that this letter is sufficient to establish a claim that was in fact filed with the Commission.
[8] Accordingly, based on our de novo review of the entire record, and for the reasons discussed herein, we find that this claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision must be reversed.
[9] IT IS SO ORDERED.
JAMES W. DANIEL, Chairman ALICE L. HOLCOMB, Commissioner
[10] Commissioner Humphrey dissents.
[11] DISSENTING OPINION
[12] I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority finding that this claim for additional benefits is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge should be affirmed.
[13] In August 1988, claimant sustained an admittedly compensable injury to her lower back. Respondent initially paid appropriate compensation benefits. At this time, Rockwood Insurance Company was on the risk. Subsequently, the employer became self-insured. Thereafter, a dispute arose as to liability concerning claimant’s continuing entitlement to benefits. At the hearing the sole question was whether Rockwood Insurance Company or the employer, as self-insured, was liable. On May 10, 1991, the Administrative Law Judge found that Rockwood Insurance Company remained liable for benefits. On this day, claimant’s attorney requested a hearing on the compensability of certain unpaid medical expenses. On October 29, 1991, the Full Commission affirmed and adopted the May 10, 1991 opinion of the Administrative Law Judge. The Commission’s opinion dealt only with overall liability and not with liability for certain specified benefits. Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s finding that “the benefits sought by the claimant in the May 10, 1991 letter were included in the benefits being considered by the Commission at the time the letter was purportedly filed and which was finally decided in the October 29, 1991, decision of the Commission.”
[14] It is clear that the May 10, 1991 claim for benefits had nothing to do with the issues decided by the Commission on October 29, 1991. Thus, claimant filed a timely claim for additional benefits in May 1991 which tolled the statute of limitations. Arkansas Power LightCo. v. Giles,
20 Ark. App. 154,
725 S.W.2d 583 (1987);Sisney v. Leisure Lodges, Inc.,
17 Ark. App. 96,
704 S.W.2d 173 (1986); Bledsoe v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
12 Ark. App. 293,
675 S.W.2d 849 (1984). Therefore, this claim for benefits is not barred by the statute of limitations.
[15] For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
[16] PAT WEST HUMPHREY, Commissioner
