BELL v. MORRIS AND COMPANY, 1996 AWCC 278

CLAIM NOS. E309056 E309057

LINDA SUE BELL, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. MORRIS AND COMPANY, EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT NO. 1 and WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANY, INSURANCE CARRIER, RESPONDENT NO. 1 and STATE OF ARKANSAS JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT NO. 2 and PUBLIC EMPLOYEE CLAIMS DIVISION, INSURANCE CARRIER, RESPONDENT NO. 2

Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED NOVEMBER 18, 1996

Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Claimant represented by FLOYD M. THOMAS, JR., Attorney at Law, El Dorado, Arkansas.

Respondents No. 1 represented by NORWOOD PHILLIPS, Attorney at Law, El Dorado, Arkansas.

Respondents No. 2 represented by RICHARD S. SMITH, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed.

[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] An Administrative Law Judge entered an opinion and order on April 16, 1996, having found that claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment with respondent employer #1 in January, 1991.

[3] Respondent #1 now appeals from that opinion and order, contending that claimant failed to prove that she sustained a compensable injury as the result of her employment with respondent employer #1.

[4] Following our de novo review of the entire record, we find that claimant has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that she did sustain a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of her employment with respondent employer #1. The decision of the Administrative Law Judge must therefore be affirmed.

[5] Claimant’s husband was the owner of Morris Co. (respondent employer #1), a women’s clothing store in El Dorado which he and his sister inherited upon their mother’s death in 1987. Claimant’s husband eventually purchased his sister’s interest in the store. Claimant herself worked in the store part of the time, and testified that while she was entitled to a salary of $1000 per month, she accepted merchandise in lieu of that amount. Her regular occupation was that of court reporter. Morris Co. was no longer in existence at the time of the hearing on this matter (April 21, 1994), having been liquidated the previous January.

[6] Claimant presented credible testimony that she injured her right elbow in January, 1991, while attempting to lift and move a clothes rack:

It’s just like if I had pulled a muscle or something. I didn’t think a whole lot about it. I did have some discomfort that day, and I remember, you know, what I was doing when I did that, but it was just something that I didn’t think a whole lot of.

[7] Claimant did not require medical attention for this injury until October, 1991, when she consulted Dr. John Moore. When questioned by the Administrative Law Judge, claimant testified that her symptoms would come and go between the time of the January, 1991, episode and her visit to Dr. Moore in October.

[8] Dr. Moore diagnosed epicondylar tendinitis and treated calmant with a series of cortisone injections which provided transient relief. Dr. Moore eventually referred her to Dr. John Yocum, a Little Rock orthopedist, who attempted further conservative management before performing a debridement of the common extensor origin on the right elbow on May 7, 1993. The events surrounding this claim occurred prior to July 1, 1993, and the provisions of Act 796 of 1993 are thus not applicable.

[9] Respondent #1 bases its appeal on what it describes as a lack of medical evidence and opinion establishing a causal relationship between claimant’s epicondylar tendinitis and the clothes rack episode of January, 1991. However, we note that causal connection is generally a matter of inference, and it is not essential that the causal connection between a work-related accident and later disabling injury be established with medical evidence. Osmose Wood Preserving v. Jones, 40 Ark. App. 190, 843 S.W.2d 875 (1992) and Bates v. Frost Logging Co.,38 Ark. App. 36, 827 S.W.2d 664 (1992). Indeed, though often important to the resolution of worker’s compensation claims, medical opinions are not deemed conclusive. Hensonv. Club Products, 22 Ark. App. 136, 736 S.W.2d 290 (1987).

[10] Also, the record is not devoid of evidence tending to suggest that claimant’s tendinitis could have resulted from the January, 1991, injury. Dr. Yocum stated in his deposition that “It’s possible that a lifting type activity could cause it. It’s more commonly caused with repetitive type or motion.” As stated above, causal connection is generally a matter of inference, and we further note that possibilities may play a proper and important role in establishing that relationship. See Osmose Wood Preservingv. Jones, supra, and Hope Brick Works v. Welch, 33 Ark. App. 103, 802 S.W.2d 476 (1991). In addition, medical opinions regarding causal connection need not be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty when there is supplemental evidence supporting the causal relationship.Hope Brick Works v. Welch, supra.

[11] Although Dr. Yocum has opined that a condition such as claimant’s is commonly associated with repetitive motion, he has by no means indicated that a lifting-type accident is simply incapable of causing epicondylar tendinitis. Instead, he has allowed that such an occurrence is a possibility. Based on this allowance, taken in conjunction with claimant’s credible description of an accident involving her right elbow in January, 1991, and continued symptoms thereafter, we are persuaded that claimant did sustain a compensable injury to her right elbow arising out of and in the course of her employment with Morris Co. in January, 1991.

[12] Based on our de novo review of the entire record, and for the reasons stated herein, we specifically find that claimant has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that she sustained a compensable injury to her right elbow arising out of and in the course of her employment with respondent employer #1 in January, 1991. The decision of the Administrative Law Judge must therefore be, and hereby is, affirmed.

[13] All accrued benefits shall be paid in a lump sum without discount and with interest thereon at the lawful rate from the date of the Administrative Law Judge’s opinion in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-809 (1987).

[14] For prevailing on this appeal before the Full Commission, claimant’s attorney is hereby awarded an additional attorney’s fee in the amount of $250.00 as provided by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 (b) (1987).

[15] IT IS SO ORDERED.

JAMES W. DANIEL, Chairman PAT WEST HUMPHREY, Commissioner

[16] Commissioner Holcomb dissents.