CLAIM NO. E610215

SHARRON MAYO, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. AREA AGENCY ON AGING, EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT and RISK MANAGEMENT RESOURCES, INSURANCE CARRIER, RESPONDENT

Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 18, 1998

Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Claimant represented by the HONORABLE CHARLES BARNETTE, Attorney at Law, Texarkana, Arkansas.

Respondents represented by the HONORABLE WALTER MURRAY, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed.

[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] The claimant appeals an opinion filed June 11, 1997, by an administrative law judge. The administrative law judge found that the claimant sustained, at most, a compensable injury on February 28, 1995, yet failed to prove that she sustained a compensable injury. The administrative law judge thus denied the claim. After reviewing the entire record de novo, we find that the claimant sustained a temporary aggravation of a preexisting condition on February 28, 1995, which resolved by April 29, 1995. We thus affirm the administrative law judge’s determination that the claimant is not entitled to any additional indemnity or medical benefits in excess of those benefits already accepted and paid by the respondents.

[3] A pre-hearing conference was held in this matter on October 17, 1996. A Pre-Hearing Order was concurrently entered, with the following stipulations:

1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction of this claim.
2. On February 28, 1995, the relationship of employee-employer-carrier existed between the parties.
3. Claimant sustained a compensable injury on February 28, 1995.

4. Medical has paid.

5. Five days of temporary total disability has been paid.

[4] The parties agreed to litigate additional TTD benefits and additional medical but reserved the issue of permanent partial disability. Two weeks following the pre-hearing conference, the administrative law judge granted a continuance so that the respondents could gather additional information. The administrative law judge continued the matter over claimant’s objection. At the beginning of the January 3, 1997, hearing, respondents withdrew their stipulation regarding compensability. The respondents now contended that the claimant’s physical problems were not related to her employment, and that she had no objective medical findings. Over the claimant’s objection, the administrative law judge amended the Pre-Hearing Order to include the issue of compensability of the alleged injury. The administrative law judge stated she would allow the claimant to continue the matter, but the claimant chose to go forward with the hearing. The administrative law judge left the record open for admission of deposition testimony and additional medical records.

[5] A stipulation of fact equals undisputed proof, leaving nothing for the fact finder to decide as to the stipulated matter. Brown v.Keaton, 232 Ark. 12, 334 S.W.2d 676 (1960). The Commission encourages stipulations, for they reduce the time and expense involved with hearings by limiting the extent of formal proof required for a particular element of proof. As a general rule, parties are bound by their stipulations. Dempsey v. MerchantsNational Bank of Fort Smith, 292 Ark. 207, 729 S.W.2d 150 (1987). However, the Commission should not rigidly enforce a stipulation where, due to special circumstances, enforcement would be unjust or produce a result contrary to established notions of justice and fair play. Adjudicative bodies such as this Commission have discretion to relieve parties from their stipulations where, due to special circumstances, enforcement would conflict with these basic notions. Edgar Jackson v. Circle T Express, Full Commission Opinion filed February 9, 1994 (E016465).

[6] A growing number of cases are coming before this Commission where the respondents accept compensability, pay benefits, and later question compensability. In the instant matter, we question whether respondents’ counsel exercised diligence in timely procuring relevant medical evidence before stipulating to compensability. Had the claimant not declined the administrative law judge’s offer to continue the case, we likely would reverse the administrative law judge’s approval of respondents’ change of position regarding compensability. In light of the administrative law judge’s offer of continuance, we will not, in this matter, rigidly enforce the pre-hearing stipulation regarding compensability. However, we need not reach the issue of compensability because we find that, even if the claimant sustained a compensable injury on February 28, 1995, we find that she failed to prove that she is entitled to any additional benefits in excess of those benefits accepted and paid by the respondents prior to the hearing in this case.

[7] The claimant began working for respondent-employer in 1986. The record contains a medical report from July, 1987, where Mr. Jeff Ulmer, a physician’s assistant at Austin Medical Clinic, found muscle spasm in the claimant’s back. Claimant also complained of back pain in August, 1992. In February, 1993, the claimant reported acute back and neck pain. The claimant, a home health aide, testified that she sustained an injury on February 28, 1995:

I was working for Ms. Wooten in her home and I just squatted down to pick up some straw out of the carpet and I caught a real sharp pain in the right side of my lower back and I almost fell the rest of the way down; I couldn’t get up, and it has never ceased to hurt until this day.

[8] The claimant reportedly told her supervisor that her back was “acting up again.” The claimant was examined by Mr. Ulmer at Austin Medical Clinic on March 7, 1995, but she did not relate a specific incident to him. Mr. Ulmer diagnosed low back strain and found same to be “healing” on March 29 and April 5, 1995. After conservative treatment, she was released p.r.n. on April 29, 1995. The claimant returned to work until March, 1996. She had a hysterectomy in April, 1996.

[9] The claimant did not seek further medical attention for her back until she returned to Austin Medical Clinic in September, 1996; she complained of back and right hip pain relating to the incident of February 28, 1995. Someone at the clinic diagnosed chronic back pain (the record is not legible) and referred her to Dr. Jeffrey DeHaan, an orthopedist. Dr. DeHaan examined the claimant on October 24, 1996:

Ms. Mayo is here as an initial patient visit having lower back problems. She dates this to February of 1995 when she describes trying to lift something in a fairly awkward situation and was struck with LBP and has continued to have LBP with some reference into the bilateral thighs, right greater than left, and also down the leg. However, she’s not been able to find any appropriate treatment or gotten any relief with any medications to date. She’s really been worked-up at all according to her with x-rays or anything else for that matter. She’s here today having persistent problems and was wondering if she could be evaluated and/or treated. PMH is remarkable for no prior surgery. She did have hysterectomy approximately 8 months ago.
PE reveals an overweight lady, but she moves fairly well as far as walking and gait is concerned. She does get up from a sitting position quite slowly. Orthopedic exam is remarkable for no motor or sensory deficits. She does have a positive SLRing on the right, mildly positive on the left. The hips have a free ROM without pain to them. X-rays taken today in the office show fairly significant degenerative changes at the L5-S1 level. She also has some facet changes. We’ll go ahead and get an MRI scan on her because of her positive SLRing, as well as the longevity of her symptoms. I think PT would also be appropriate at this time, since she certainly is deconditioned with this long of a problem. Also we’ll get her into a LS corset and see if this might not benefit her. We’ll do this and I’ll check her back here again in three weeks.

[10] The claimant contends that she never had a lower back problem prior to the workplace incident (although the record contains three different instances of back pain prior to the alleged compensable injury). Claimant avers that she was not treated from April, 1995 to September, 1996, because she could not pay for treatment. Nor could she pay for a MRI scan. However, we find that the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the claimant temporarily aggravated a preexisting degenerative condition on February 28, 1995. We find that this temporary aggravation did not accelerate or combine with her preexisting condition, but instead it completely resolved by April 29, 1995, the time of her release. We therefore find that the claimant is not entitled to additional medical benefits.

[11] In reaching our decision, we note that x-rays taken in October, 1996, showed significant degenerative changes at L5-S1, in addition to facet changes. The claimant does not contend on appeal that she aggravated a preexisting condition; however, counsel queried Dr. DeHaan at a deposition:

Q. You took the history, and if she testified, which she did, that she injured her low back when she squatted down to get straw out of the carpet while working, also testified that she’d never had any problems with her back prior to this time, and you did an examination, took a history and also took x-rays, is it your opinion that her squatting down to pick up that straw while in the course and scope of her employment aggravated a pre-existing condition?

A. Yeah.

[12] Accordingly, based on our de novo review of the entire record, and for the reasons discussed herein, we find that the claimant sustained, at most, a temporary aggravation of a preexisting arthritic condition on February 28, 1995, which resolved by April 29, 1995. We therefore affirm the finding of the administrative law judge that the claimant is not entitled to additional medical benefits.

[13] IT IS SO ORDERED.

ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman

[14] Commissioner Wilson concurs.

[15] CONCURRING OPINION
[16] I concur in the majority’s finding that the claimant sustained a temporary aggravation of a pre-existing arthritic condition on February 28, 1995 which resolved by April 29, 1995. Accordingly, I concur with the majority’s finding that the claimant is not entitled to additional medical benefits.

[17] MIKE WILSON, Commissioner

[18] Commissioner Humphrey dissents.

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