WITHERSPOON v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, 1997 AWCC 357

CLAIM NOS. E507849, E507845 E313745

ROBERT L. WITHERSPOON, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT and PUBLIC EMPLOYEE CLAIMS DIVISION, CARRIER, RESPONDENT

Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED SEPTEMBER 4, 1997

Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION, Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Claimant represented by ROBERT S. TSCHIEMER, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Respondent represented by NATHAN C. CULP, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Reversed.

[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] Respondent appeals from a decision of the Administrative Law Judge filed January 9, 1997 finding that the treatment claimant received after December 8, 1993, was reasonable and necessary for the treatment of claimant’s compensable injury. Based upon our denovo review of the entire record, we find that claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge.

[3] Claimant sustained a compensable electrical shock injury on June 22, 1993. Respondent accepted the injury as compensable and paid temporary total disability benefits and medical benefits through December 8, 1993. On September 29, 1993, claimant was released to return to full duty by his treating physician, Dr. Anna Redman. After being released to return to work, claimant continued to complain of pain and respondent agreed to have claimant examined by Dr. Barry Baskins. Dr. Baskins ordered nerve conduction studies which were essentially within normal limits. Dr. Baskins’ examination and testing all proved negative. In his November 16, 1993, report Dr. Baskins noted “overall, he seems to want to lay the blame on everybody for his problems and his inability to get back to work.”

[4] Claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the credible evidence that medical treatment is reasonable and necessary. Norma Beatty v. Ben Pearson, Inc., Full Workers’ Compensation Commission, Feb. 17, 1989 (D612291); B.R.Hollingshead v. Colson Caster, Full Workers’ Compensation Commission, Aug. 27, 1993 (D703346). In workers’ compensation cases, the burden rests upon the claimant to establish his claim for compensation by a preponderance of the evidence. Kuhn v.Majestic Hotel, 50 Ark. App. 23, 899 S.W.2d 845 (1995); Bartlettv. Mead Container Board, 47 Ark. App. 181, 888 S.W.2d 314 (1994). When assessing whether medical treatment is reasonably necessary for the treatment of a compensable injury, we must analyze both the proposed procedure and the condition it is sought to remedy.Deborah Jones v. Seba, Inc., FC Opinion Dec. 13, 1989 (D512553).

[5] In our opinion, we find that claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the treatment he received after being released by Dr. Redman and after being examined by Dr. Baskins was reasonably necessary for the treatment of claimant’s compensable injury. In her deposition, Dr. Redman testified that the continued treatment of the claimant was not related to claimant’s electric shock injury. Even after being explained by claimant’s attorney that a medical opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty was not necessary for claimant to prove the compensability of the additional treatment, Dr. Redman continued to state that she did not believe claimant’s continued treatment was related to claimant’s compensable injury. Dr. Redman explained:

Typically that has not been a problem with my experience in patients who have had an electrical shock injury. The amount of shock which he obtained is a little hard to quantify because of the fact that a lot of times electrical shock will be intensified by the fact that he was standing on wet ground, which makes the — the voltage may be more intense than what is actually given off by the electrical source itself. But in my experience, most people have a very short term problem that is relieved with just minimal intervention with no long-term sequel. I would like to clarify, too, I am not an expert on electrical shock injuries, however. So as I say, this is from my personal experience with my patients and other people that I have treated with similar injuries.

[6] When claimant continued to complain of pain which Dr. Redman no longer felt to be related to claimant’s compensable injury, Dr. Redman referred claimant to Dr. Rebecca Knott. Although Dr. Knott stated in her medical reports that claimant’s complaints arose from claimant’s compensable injury, Dr. Knott’s only basis for such statement is the history provided to her by the claimant. The Commission is not bound by a doctor’s opinion which is based largely on facts related to him by claimant where there is no sufficient independent knowledge upon which to corroborate claimant’s claim. Roberts v. Leo-Levi Hospital, 8 Ark. App. 184, 649 S.W.2d 402 (1983).

[7] It is important to note that Dr. Knott was unable to find anything wrong with the claimant other than claimant’s complaints of pain. Dr. Knott referred claimant to Dr. Judy White Johnson, a psychologist. Dr. Johnson performed a battery of tests on claimant and determined that there was a one hundred percent (100%) likelihood that claimant was feigning and exaggerating his physical and mental complaints. In light of Dr. Johnson’s report it is interesting to note that Dr. Redman testified in her deposition that claimant’s responses when she examined him were out of proportion to the amount of discomfort that one would feel in that area. Dr. Redman specifically stated:

I feel that there were times that he perhaps exacerbated — or not exacerbated — but exaggerated his response to my examinations beyond what another patient would in similar circumstances.

[8] In our opinion, the overwhelming weight of the medical evidence clearly shows that after claimant was released to return to work by Dr. Redman and after claimant was examined by Dr. Baskins all treatment claimant received was not reasonably necessary for the treatment of claimant’s compensable injury. The record shows that claimant exaggerated and feigned his symptoms. There is no evidence that claimant continued to suffer from any actual physical or mental problems as a result of his compensable injury after being released by Dr. Redman in September of 1993. Therefore, we find that claimant has failed to prove that additional medical treatment after being released by Dr. Redman and after being examined by Dr. Baskins was reasonable and necessary for the treatment of claimant’s compensable injury. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge.

[9] IT IS SO ORDERED.

ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman MIKE WILSON, Commissioner

[10] Commissioner Humphrey dissents.