CLAIM NOS. E315252 and E315253
Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED JUNE 21, 1996
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE G. WAYNE MOONEY, Attorney at Law, Harrisburg, Arkansas.
Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 represented by the HONORABLE GAIL PONDER GAINES, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 3 represented by the HONORABLE RANDY P. MURPHY, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed.
[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] The claimant appeals an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on June 29, 1995. In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge found that the claimant failed to prove that he sustained a compensable injury to his spine, arising out of and in the course of his employment with the respondent employer.
[10] If the claimant fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence any of the requirements for establishing the compensability of the injury alleged, he fails to establish the compensability of the claim, and compensation must be denied. Reed, supra. [11] In the present claim, we find that the claimant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained an injury to the lower back caused by a specific incident which is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. In this regard, the claimant relates his current lower back problems to the frontend loader incident which occurred around March 15, 1993. As discussed, however, the claimant’s only complaints at that time involved a headache and sore muscles in the neck and shoulder, and the claimant testified during deposition that his headache, neck, and shoulder pains had resolved by the next day. Although the claimant testified at the hearing that he began to experience back or leg pain perhaps one month after the March frontend loader incident, the claimant’s deposition testimony and medical records from the Searcy Medical Center on August 2, 1993, both indicate that the claimant did not begin to experience back or leg pain until May or June of 1993. Moreover, the testimony of co-workers William Ramer, William Vance, and Jerry Vance indicate that the claimant continued to work long hours performing heavy manual labor until he terminated his employment in August. Lonnie Dill, the co-worker who observed the frontend loader incident in March, was the only coworker who could recall the claimant ever commenting on having back or leg pain while working for the respondent employer, and Mr. Dill testified that he recalled the claimant saying that he was hurting down in his back when he first got out of the front-end loader. However, Mr. Dill’s testimony is contrary to the claimant’s own recollection that he only experienced a headache and neck and shoulder pain when the front-end loader incident occurred, and did not experience any back pain until one to three months later. [12] In short, the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the claimant experienced a minor jar while operating his frontend loader in March of 1993, and that his symptoms of headache and upper body muscle aches resolved the next day. In addition, the preponderance of the credible evidence establishes that the claimant did not experience any back or leg pain during the two to three month period after March 15, 1993. He continued to perform his regular duties until he terminated his employment in August without any indication to co-workers that he was experiencing low back or leg pain. In addition, the claimant did not seek medical attention until August and he did not report a work-related injury until after he terminated his employment in August approximately five months after the frontend loader incident. [13] In reaching our decision, we note that Dr. Williams testified that he placed no significance on the claimant’s failure to report any back or leg pain within hours, days, or even one month after his alleged injury. However, Dr. Williams also acknowledged that a damaged disk will usually cause some back pain, and that a ruptured disk or a facet joint cynovial cyst will both usually cause leg pain. Moreover, Dr. Williams also acknowledged that he could not state with any degree of medical certainty that the mass detected by MRI on November 11, 1993, was causally related to the frontend loader incident in March of 1993. Notably, the November 11, 1993, MRI report of Dr. David Tamas indicates that the mass detected in the claimant’s lumbar spine is “most likely” a facet joint synovial cyst and not an extruded disc fragment, based on its appearance and location. In that regard, Dr. Williams acknowledged that a synovial cyst is generally associated with a degenerative change in a joint, whereas a disc injury is more commonly associated with trauma. [14] Accordingly, after a de novo review of the entire record and for the reasons discussed herein, we find that the claimant failed to prove that he sustained an injury caused by a specific incident that is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Consequently, we find that the claimant failed to satisfy the requirements necessary to establish an injury under Ark. Code Ann. § § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i). Therefore, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision must be, and hereby is, affirmed. [15] IT IS SO ORDERED.(1) proof by a preponderance of the evidence of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996); Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(E)(i) (Repl. 1996); see also, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1996));
(2) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body which required medical services or resulted in disability or death (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996));
(3) medical evidence supported by objective findings, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16), establishing the injury (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(D) (Repl. 1996));
(4) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996)).
JAMES W. DANIEL, Chairman ALICE L. HOLCOMB, Commissioner
[16] Commissioner Humphrey dissents.44 Ark. 46 Supreme Court of Arkansas. Glenn v. Glenn. November Term, 1884. Headnotes 1.…
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