CLAIM NO. F011933
Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED JULY 15, 2002
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by HONORABLE GARY DAVIS, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Respondent represented by HONORABLE WILLIAM F. SMITH, Attorney at Law, Russellville, Arkansas.
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed.
OPINION AND ORDER
The claimant appeals to the Full Commission an Administrative Law Judge’s opinion filed January 3, 2002. The Administrative Law Judge found that the claimant failed to prove that additional medical treatment was reasonably necessary for her compensable injury of October 17, 2000. The Administrative Law Judge also found that the claimant failed to prove that she was entitled to temporary total disability compensation. After reviewing the entire record de novo, the Full Commission affirms the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge.
I. HISTORY
Tina Bradley, age 39, became employed with ConAgra Foods in about July 1998. Dr. Harold B. Betton wrote to the respondent-employer on April 5, 1999:
Ms. Bradley, one of your employees, is suffering from problems with her cervical and lumbar spine. . . . I would like for you to provide modified work for her if possible. She has difficulties standing for long periods of time and may have problems with repetitive shoulder work.
The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury to her neck and back as the result of a specific incident occurring on or about October 17, 2000. The claimant testified that she was working as a line server:
Q. And did you hurt your left shoulder and neck at that time?
A. Yes. My arm went out when I went to pick up — I was breaking down a box and, when I went to pick up another bag of salt pouches that was in the box to put them back in the tub because we had to get the temp down, my arm went out and just started swelling on me.
The claimant began receiving conservative treatment for bilateral shoulder pain beginning October 17, 2000. The claimant complained of swelling in her left hand and arm on October 20, 2000. Dr. Ben J. Kriesel wrote that he had treated the claimant from October 20, 2000 to October 26, 2000, and that the claimant could return to work with no restrictions on October 26, 2000. Dr. Krisel diagnosed “Left shoulder Trapezial Myositis Strain.”
However, Dr. Finley P. Turner diagnosed “Rotator cuff injury involving the left shoulder” on November 13, 2000. The claimant was placed on restricted duty on November 13, 2000: “No lifting or carrying over 10 pounds. Not to raise Lt. arm above mid. chest.”
Dr. W. Bruce Brown examined the claimant on January 9, 2001:
Xrays are negative except for a Type II to III acromion.
IMPRESSION: Muscle overuse, probably secondary to overlifting vs muscle injury left shoulder.
Dr. Brown recommended a return to physical therapy with a “more aggressive strengthening program.” Dr. Brown reported on February 1, 2001:
She has had an MRI which demonstrates a C5-6 disk that appears to be more to the right of midline than the left. Most of her symptoms are still to the left, although she does have some mid-upper back pain and irritation.
Dr. Brown continued conservative treatment and light duty, and he arranged additional diagnostic testing. Dr. Brown thereafter reported on March 5, 2001:
Tina follows up for review of her MRI and EMG/NCS. She still is still having pain in the base of her neck, left periscapular region in her shoulder, and really does not have any specific anatomic distribution. On exam she has full ROM of her shoulder and cervical spine. No spasm is appreciated. Her MRI demonstrated normal shoulder with only mild effusion in the subacromial space but no specific injury to the rotator cuff or other structures. Her EMG/NCS were normal except for active trapezius muscle firing.
My feeling is that I don’t have anything objective to limit Tina’s activities, so I have released her to full activity. She informs me today that she would like to have a second opinion, and I have told her that this is fine and that we will provide any records to that person should she want to proceed with that. Right now I don’t have any objective findings and have recommended that she try to return to work full time, and if unable to do this, then she may consider changing jobs at that time.
Ms. Bradley claimed entitlement to additional workers’ compensation. The claimant contended that she sustained “admittedly-compensable injuries to the spine” on or about October 17, 2000. The claimant contended that only company physicians had treated her, and the claimant requested to be seen “by a physician of her own choosing.” In the alternative, the claimant requested an independent medical examination.
The respondent contended that it had paid all benefits which were causally related to the “alleged injury.” The respondent contended that the claimant “has already requested a change of physician which respondent agreed upon, and claimant changed from Dr. Turner to Dr. Krisel, who referred her to Dr. Brown.”
The parties agreed to litigate the following issues:
1. Whether the claimant was entitled to additional medical treatment;
2. Whether the claimant was entitled to temporary total disability compensation from April 4, 2001 until a date to be determined; and
3. Attorney’s fee.
After a hearing before the Commission, the Administrative Law Judge found that the claimant failed to prove that she was entitled to additional medical treatment or temporary total disability compensation. The claimant appeals to the Full Commission.
II. ADJUDICATION A. Medical treatment
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-508(a) states that the employer shall promptly provide for an injured employee such medical services as may be reasonably necessary in connection with the injury received by the employee. The injured employee has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that medical treatment is reasonably necessary for treatment of the compensable injury. Beatty v. BenPearson, Inc., Workers’ Compensation Commission D612291 (Feb. 17, 1989). In assessing whether a particular medical procedure is reasonably necessary for treatment of the compensable injury, we analyze the proposed medical procedure and the condition it is sought to remedy. Jonesv. Seba, Inc., Workers’ Compensation Commission D511255 (Dec. 13, 1989). What constitutes reasonably necessary medical treatment pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-508(a) is a fact question for the Commission. WrightContracting Co. v. Randall, 12 Ark. App. 358, 676 S.W.2d 750 (1984).
We note that the claimant bears the burden of proof in establishing entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits and must sustain that burden by a preponderance of the evidence. The respondent-employer owes only those benefits that are reasonably necessary in connection with the compensable injury sustained by the employee. See, Beatty, supra, Morrowv. Mulberry Lumber Co., 5 Ark. App. 260, 635 S.W.2d 283 (1982); Daltonv. Allen Eng’g Co., 66 Ark. App. 201, 989 S.W.2d 543 (1999); GEOSpecialty Chemical v. Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000).
In the present case, the Full Commission finds that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that additional medical treatment was reasonably necessary in connection with her compensable injury. The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury to her “neck and back” as the result of a specific incident occurring on or about October 17, 2000. The claimant testified that she injured her “left shoulder and neck,” and that her “arm went out” and began swelling. The record indicates that the claimant was treated for “bilateral shoulder pain” beginning October 17, 2000.
The claimant was granted a change of physician to Dr. Krisel, who diagnosed “Left shoulder Trapezial Myositis Strain” on October 26, 2000. Dr. Turner diagnosed left shoulder “Rotator cuff injury” on November 13, 2000. The claimant was ultimately referred to an orthopaedist, Dr. Brown. Dr. Brown noted in January 2001 that x-rays of the shoulder were negative, and his impression was “Muscle overuse” of the left shoulder. On March 5, 2001, Dr. Brown reported that the claimant had full range of motion of her shoulder and cervical spine, with no muscle spasm. Dr. Brown could find no “objective findings” on which to provide additional treatment, so he released the claimant.
We recognize that a claimant does not have to support a continuing need for medical treatment with “objective medical findings.” Chamber DoorIndustries, Inc. v. Graham, 59 Ark. App. 224, 956 S.W.2d 196 (1997);Hambelton v. Guy King Sons, Workers’ Compensation Commission E904812
(Feb. 22, 2001). However, the claimant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that additional medical treatment is reasonably necessary in connection with her compensable injury. See, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-508(a); Beatty, supra. Based on the record before us, the Full Commission finds that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any medical treatment subsequent to March 5, 2001 was reasonably necessary in connection with her compensable injury. We therefore affirm the Administrative Law Judge’s finding that the claimant failed to prove that she was entitled to additional medical treatment.
B. Temporary disability
Temporary disability is determined by the extent to which a compensable injury has affected the claimant’s ability to earn a livelihood. An injured employee is entitled to temporary total disability compensation during the period of time that she is within her healing period and totally incapacitated to earn wages. Arkansas State Highway andTransportation Department v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W.2d 392
(1981). An injured employee is entitled to temporary partial disability compensation during the period that she is within her healing period and suffers only a decrease in her capacity to earn the wages that she was receiving at the time of the injury. Id. The “healing period” is defined as the period necessary for the healing of an injury resulting from an accident. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(12). The healing period continues until the employee is as far restored as the permanent character of her injury will permit. When the underlying condition causing the disability becomes stable, and when nothing further will improve that condition, the healing period has ended. The claimant is not entitled to receive temporary total disability compensation or temporary partial disability compensation after the end of her healing period. Trader v. Single SourceTransportation, Workers’ Compensation Commission E507484 (Feb. 12, 1999).
In the present matter, the Full Commission affirms the Administrative Law Judge’s finding that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to temporary total disability compensation. The claimant has been released to return to work by each treating physician, including Dr. Kriesel, Dr. Turner, and Dr. Brown. Dr. Brown expressly released the claimant to “full activity” on March 5, 2001. The Full Commission also finds, based on Dr. Brown’s comprehensive report of March 5, 2001, that the claimant reached the end of the healing period for her compensable injury no later than March 5, 2001. The Full Commission finds that the preponderance of the evidence does not support the Dissenting Opinion’s assertion that the claimant remains within her healing period and totally incapacitated to earn wages.
Based on our de novo review of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that the claimant failed to prove that she was entitled to temporary total disability compensation. We also find that the claimant failed to prove that she was entitled to additional medical services subsequent to March 5, 2001. We therefore affirm the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge. This claim is denied and dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________________ ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman
_______________________________ JOE E. YATES, Commissioner
Commissioner Turner dissents.