BRITT v. STEVE WARD PULP, 1996 AWCC 212

CLAIM NO. E500585

VIRGIL BRITT, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. STEVE WARD PULP, EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT and WAUSAU INS. GROUP, CARRIER, RESPONDENT

Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED SEPTEMBER 5, 1996

Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION, Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Claimant represented by CHARLES BARNETTE, Attorney at Law, Texarkana, Arkansas.

Respondent represented by JOSEPH KILPATRICK, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Reversed.

[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] Respondent appeals from a decision of the Administrative Law Judge filed November 22, 1995 finding that the claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant developed carpal tunnel syndrome as a direct result of an injury he sustained on April 17, 1994 and finding entitlement to reinstatement of temporary total disability benefits commencing on March 23, 1995 and continuing through a date yet to be determined. Based upon our de novo review of the entire record, we find that the claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof.

[3] At the hearing held on October 26, 1995, it was stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury to his low back on April 17, 1994 when a tree limb fell and struck him across the back. Respondent accepted the injury as compensable and paid benefits through March 22, 1995. The claimant contended that in addition to injuring his back on April 17, 1994, he received a traumatic injury to both hands causing him to develop carpal tunnel syndrome bilaterally. In addition, the claimant contended that he is entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits subsequent to March 23, 1995 as he was still in his healing period for his low back injury. Respondent controverted any benefits claimed as a result of the carpal tunnel syndrome as well as entitlement to the additional temporary total disability benefits.

[4] Since the claimant’s injury occurred on April 17, 1994, the claim is governed by Act 796 of 1993. The claimant in the present claim alleges that he sustained an injury as a result of a specific incident which is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Therefore, the following requirements must be satisfied:

(1) proof by a preponderance of the evidence of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. (Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102
(5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996); Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (5)(E)(i) (Repl. 1996);
(2) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body. (Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996);
(3) medical evidence supported by objective findings, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102
(16) (Repl. 1996), establishing the injury (Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (5)(D) (Repl. 1996));
(4) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence (Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102
(5)(a)(i) (Repl. 1996));

[5] If the claimant fails to establish by a preponderance of the credible evidence any of the requirements for establishing the compensability of the injury he fails to establish the compensability of the claim, and compensation must be denied.Jerry D. Reed v. ConAgra Frozen Foods, FC Opinion filed Feb. 2, 1995 (E317744).

[6] The evidence is clear that the claimant did sustain an injury on April 17, 1994 when the limb fell out of a tree striking the claimant in the back. However, we find that the claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained an injury to his hands and wrist as a result of that specific incident. Moreover, we find that the claimant has failed to prove the compensability of his carpal tunnel syndrome by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

[7] The claimant’s injury occurred in April of 1994. It was not until November of 1994 that the claimant first complained of pain in his wrist. The records of Dr. James Armstrong and Dr. Joe Shelton revealed no evidence of hand or wrist problems. Both Dr. Armstrong and Dr. Shelton treated claimant shortly after his compensable injury. Interestingly, their notes contain no record of any hand or arm problems during their treatment of the claimant. It was not until after eight months had passed that the claimant first complained of such pain. The first record of any hand or wrist complaints is seen and Dr. Knight’s December 12, 1994 correspondence to Dr. Shelton. Dr. Knight describes claimant’s low back pain and “ill defined circumferential numbness from the hand up to the shoulder.” It is hard to imagine that if the claimant had sustained a double crush injury to his wrist as a result of the limb falling on him in April of 1994 that he would not complain of wrist or arm pain for over eight months. It is also difficult to believe that if the claimant had sustained a double crush injury to his wrist, that the doctors who treated him when he was in the hospital for his injury would not note any problems, pain, numbness, bruises or complaints associated with the claimant’s hands, wrists or arms.

[8] Claimant’s reliance on the “eyewitness” testimony of Hubert Harris, Jr., to support an injury to the claimant’s hands is misplaced. Mr. Harris testified that he did not actually see what happened, he merely turned and saw the claimant on the ground after he heard the limb hit the claimant and knock him to the ground. Both Mr. Harris and the claimant testified that they could not hear the limb falling and they did not know it was falling until after it struck the claimant and knocked him down. Mr. Harris was busy doing his job and he did not see the claimant’s position at the time of the fall.

[9] Interestingly, it was not until after respondents controverted the carpal tunnel syndrome that Dr. Knight expressed any opinion regarding the causation of the carpal tunnel. The Commission is not bound by a doctor’s opinion which is based largely on facts related to him by claimant where there is no sufficient independent knowledge upon which to corroborate claimant’s claim. Roberts v. Leo-Levi Hospital, 8 Ark. App. 184, 649 S.W.2d 402 (1983). Moreover, the Commission has the authority to accept or reject medical opinions, and its resolution of the medical evidence has the force and effect of a jury verdict.McClain v. Texaco, Inc., 29 Ark. Spp. 218, 780 S.W.2d 34 (1989).

[10] Given the significant amount of time between the claimant’s compensable injury and his first complaint of arm problems, we find that the claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence the compensability of his carpal tunnel syndrome.

[11] In addition, we find that even if the lapse in time had not occurred, the claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof with regards to proving compensability by medical opinions supported by objective findings, stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Although Dr. Knight stated in August 1995 correspondence that the claimant’s compensable injury and carpal tunnel syndrome are related, Dr. Knight’s opinion fails to meet the requirements set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102
(5)(D) and § 11-9-102(16). A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence, supported by objective findings. There are no objective findings to establish the compensability of the claimant’s carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Knight’s opinion regarding causation is based solely upon the history the claimant related to him of no prior hand complaints. The claimant’s history is not objective findings. Moreover, Dr. Knight’s assumption that the symptoms would not have developed without the April 17, 1994 incident, does not meet the requirement of an opinion stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Medical opinions based upon postulations fail to establish compensability under Act 796.

[12] Finally, we find that the preponderance of the evidence clearly shows that the claimant’s healing period for his compensable low back injury has ended. Dr. Knight’s December 12, 1994 neurological examination of the claimant’s low back was normal. Moreover, Dr. Moore found the claimant to be normal in the lumbar and lower extremities. Although the claimant was still complaining of pain as late as October of 1995, pain is not sufficient to extend the healing period. The healing period continues until the employee is a far restored as the permanent character of his injury will permit. Mad Butcher, Inc. v. Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982). If the underlying condition causing the disability has become stable and if nothing further in the way of treatment will improve that condition, the healing period has ended. Id. The persistence of pain may not of itself prevent a finding that the healing period is over, provided that the underlying condition has stabilized. We find that as of March 22, 1995, the claimant’s condition had stabilized and his healing period had ended.

[13] Accordingly, based upon our de novo review of all the evidence, we find that the claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his carpal tunnel syndrome is compensable. In addition, we find that the claimant has failed to prove entitlement to additional temporary total disability benefits. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge.

[14] IT IS SO ORDERED.

JAMES W. DANIEL, Chairman PAT WEST HUMPHREY, Commissioner ALICE L. HOLCOMB, Commissioner