CLAIM NOS. E003963 and E003964
BILLY BUCHALLA, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. TYSON FOODS, INC., SELF-INSURED EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT
Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED MAY 10, 1995
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE EDDIE H. WALKER, JR., Attorney at Law, Fort Smith, Arkansas.
Respondents represented by the HONORABLE BUDDY CHADICK, Attorney at Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed.
[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] The respondents appeal an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on August 10, 1994. In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge found that the claimant’s current back problems are the result of his original compensable injury and that the respondents are responsible for reasonably necessary medical treatment for these back problems. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision must be affirmed.
[3] A prior hearing was held in this claim, and, as a result of that hearing, an administrative law judge filed an opinion and order on January 28, 1991, finding that the claimant sustained a compensable back injury on August 17, 1989. In addition, the administrative law judge found that the claimant sustained a 25% permanent partial disability, with 15% representing permanent physical impairment and 10% representing additional impairment to the claimant’s earning capacity. The administrative law judge’s finding that the claimant sustained a compensable injury was based on the finding that a work-related accident caused a pre-existing degenerative condition which was previously asymptomatic to become symptomatic and disabling. The Full Commission affirmed and adopted the administrative law judge’s decision in an opinion and order filed November 20, 1990, and the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision in an unpublished opinion delivered November 25, 1992.
[4] Another hearing was subsequently held on June 23, 1994. This hearing resulted in the administrative law judge’s August 10, 1994, opinion and order and in the present appeal. At that hearing, the claimant contended that he continued to experience back problems which are the result of the August 17, 1989, injury and that he was entitled to additional medical treatment. The respondents contended that the claimant’s current back problems are not related to his compensable injury and, alternatively, that additional medical treatment is not reasonably necessary for treatment of the injury.
[5] In deposition testimony submitted into the record at this hearing, the claimant’s treating physician, Dr. James Buie, testified that the claimant continues to complain of symptoms which are essentially the same as he was experiencing when he assigned the 15% impairment rating, and he testified that the claimant’s condition had remained essentially unchanged for the previous two years. Dr. Buie also indicated that he thought that the claimant’s current condition was causally related to the compensable injury. Both the claimant and his wife testified at the hearing that he had not sustained any other injuries to his back since the August 17, 1989, injury. In addition, the claimant testified that the employment that he has held since the injury has not been physically demanding and that these jobs did not involve any repetitive bending, stooping, or twisting. In fact, the respondents conceded at the end of the hearing that the claimant had not sustained a subsequent injury.
[6] The respondents contend that the claimant’s condition had stabilized by July of 1990 and that any problems he subsequently experienced were caused by aggravations of the preexisting degenerative condition, which was not caused by the employment. However, a preexisting disease or infirmity does not disqualify a claim if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the disability for which compensation is sought.Nashville Livestock Commission v. Cox,
302 Ark. 69,
787 S.W.2d 664 (1990); Minor v. Poinsett Lumber Mfg. Co.,
235 Ark. 195,
357 S.W.2d 504 (1962); Conway Convalescent Centerv. Murphree,
266 Ark. 985,
588 S.W.2d 462 (Ark.App. 1979). As is commonly stated, the employer takes the employee as he finds her. Murphree, supra. In such cases, the test is not whether the injury causes the condition, but rather the test is whether the injury aggravates, accelerates, or combines with the condition. Little, supra. Furthermore, when an injury arises out of and in the course of employment, the employer is responsible for every natural consequence that flows from the injury. Bearden Lumber Co. v. Bond,
7 Ark. App. 65,
644 S.W.2d 321 (1983). Consequently, when subsequent complications are the natural and probable result of the original injury, the employer remains liable. The employer is relieved of liability for compensation benefits only if the subsequent complications result from an independent intervening cause which independently contributes to the claimant’s condition. Bearden, supra.
[7] In the present claim, this Commission found in our previous decision that the August 17, 1989, incident aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the claimant’s preexisting condition to produce his disability, and the Commission found that the claimant sustained a 25% permanent partial disability as a result of this compensable injury, with 15% representing the permanent physical impairment established by the medical evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. Those decisions are now final, and res judicata bars relitigation of these issues. Therefore, the respondents cannot now contend that the problems that the claimant experienced as a result of that injury are not compensable. Furthermore, the preponderance of the evidence presented at the June 23, 1994, hearing establishes that the claimant has continued to experience problems since his condition stabilized and Dr. Buie assigned a permanent impairment rating, and the preponderance of the evidence establishes that these problems have remained essentially unchanged since that time. Moreover, there is no evidence of any intervening cause which would relieve the respondents of liability, which they have candidly admitted. Therefore, we find that the back problems which the claimant has continued to experience are causally related to the compensable injury and that the respondents remain liable for any medical treatment which is reasonably necessary for treatment of these problems.
[8] The respondents also contend that medical treatment provided subsequent to July of 1990 was not reasonably necessary because the claimant’s treating physicians have indicated that his condition stabilized at that time and that no further medical treatment would improve his condition. While this is true, it merely means that the claimant’s healing period ended at that time. However, although the evidence indicates that no further medical treatment will improve the claimant’s condition, the evidence indicates that the medical provided to the claimant has been intended to reduce or enable him to cope with the chronic pain attributable to the compensable injury and to maintain his condition after the healing period ended. Furthermore, the Commission has previously held that medical treatment intended to reduce or enable an injured worker to cope with chronic pain attributable to a compensable injury may constitute reasonably necessary medical treatment. TinaHaskins v. TEC, Full Workers’ Compensation Commission, opinion filed July 14, 1993 (Claim No.
E107391); BillyChronister v. Lavaca Vault, Full Workers’ Compensation Commission, opinion filed Jun. 20, 1991 (Claim No.
D704562). In addition, the Court of Appeals has held that respondents remain liable for medical treatment reasonably necessary to maintain a claimant’s condition after the healing period ends. Artex Hydrophonics. Inc v. Pippin,
8 Ark. App. 200,
649 S.W.2d 845 (1983). Therefore, we find that the respondents are liable for the medical treatment provided to the claimant in the past and for all medical treatment reasonably necessary for treatment of the compensable injury in the future.
[9] Accordingly, based on our de novo review of the entire record, and for the reasons discussed herein, we find that the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the back problems which the claimant has continued to experience are causally related to his compensable injury. In addition, we find that the respondents are liable for the medical treatment provided to the claimant in the past and for all medical treatment reasonably necessary for treatment of the compensable injury in the future. Therefore, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision must be, and hereby is, affirmed. The respondents are directed to comply with the order contained in the administrative law judge’s decision.
[10] All accrued benefits shall be paid in a lump sum without discount and with interest thereon at the lawful rate from the date of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. §
11-9-809
(1987). For prevailing on this appeal before the Full Commission, claimant’s attorney is hereby awarded an additional attorney’s fee in the amount of $250.00 in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. §
11-9-715 (b) (1987).
[11] IT IS SO ORDERED.
JAMES W. DANIEL, Chairman PAT WEST HUMPHREY, Commissioner
[12] Commissioner Tatum dissents.
