CLAIM NO. E516680
Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED AUGUST 18, 1997
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE J. W. GREEN, Attorney at Law, Stuttgart, Arkansas.
Respondent represented by the HONORABLE NATHAN C. CULP, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Decision of the administrative law judge: Affirmed.
[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] The claimant appeals an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on October 23, 1996. In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge held that the claimant failed to establish that she suffered a compensable injury. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision must be affirmed.
[5] If the employee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence any of the requirements for establishing the compensability of the injury alleged, he fails to establish the compensability of the claim, and compensation must be denied.Reed, supra. In the present case, we find that the claimant failed to establish by credible evidence any of the criteria necessary to establish a compensable injury under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii). [6] The claimant is attempting to establish the compensability of her claim based solely upon certain reports from Dr. Sue Frigon, her treating physician, and upon the testimony of Ms. Hermina Wilson. Dr. Frigon has opined that the claimant’s job activities caused her shoulder condition to develop. However, we note that there was no testimony offered by the claimant establishing what her activities were or how they could have resulted in her condition. Also, there is no evidence in the record that indicates the nature of the claimant’s shoulder problem or the potential etiologies for that type of condition. In a report dated October 10, 1995, Dr. Frigon referred to a “frozen shoulder.” However, there are no other explanations in the medical records describing the claimant’s symptoms or problems. [7] The only witness that testified in this case was Hermina Wilson. Ms. Wilson characterized herself as a vocational consultant case manager. Ms. Wilson apparently observed the claimant at work for approximately two hours on October 4, 1995. During that time, Ms. Wilson indicated that the claimant’s job involved the issuance of drivers licenses, license plates, and computer referencing. However, Ms. Wilson’s testimony was of little value. From reviewing her testimony, it appears that Ms. Wilson was relying primarily upon the job description of the claimant’s position set out in her employment evaluation forms, and not an analysis of tasks the claimant actually performed. In describing her observations of the claimant, she was unable to state how many customers the claimant had performed services for, nor could she specifically recite the activities that the claimant performed. In fact, Ms. Wilson admitted that her evaluation of the claimant was subjective and that her observations of her had not been during one of the office’s busier times. Ms. Wilson also admitted that she was not aware of what activities the claimant would have performed either before or after the two hours which she observed her. For those reasons, we find that this testimony is entitled to little weight. [8] In short, the claimant did not offer any evidence showing specifically what it is that she does during the work day or how such activity could have caused her “frozen shoulder” to develop. Also, while Ms. Wilson’s testimony indicates the claimant’s job was somewhat repetitive, her testimony does not indicate that the claimant’s duties in the revenue office required any degree of rapid motion. The claimant did not offer any medical evidence explaining what her shoulder condition is, or how it could have arisen. We also note that while Dr. Frigon’s opinions are stated clearly, she does not set out any basis for them nor does she recite any objective findings to support her conclusion that the claimant’s injury was job related. Moreover, Dr. Frigon’s opinions do not address the nature of the claimant’s work duties or how those duties might possibly relate to the symptoms described by the claimant. [9] In reaching our decision, we also note that the claimant experienced a variety of medical conditions over the years which required her to take steroids and various other medications. There are also references in the medical records to the claimant sustaining a shoulder injury sometime prior to her alleged work-related injury. Since there was no evidence offered as to when the claimant became employed by the respondent, we have no way to determining the extent that these preexisting shoulder problems were the result of some non-related job cause as compared to an alleged work-related shoulder injury. [10] Therefore, after conducting a de novo review of the entire record, and for the reasons discussed herein, we find that the claimant failed to prove that she sustained any shoulder injury arising out of and during the course of her employment; failed to prove that her job duties required rapid repetitive motion; failed to establish an alleged shoulder injury by objective findings; and, failed to show that any alleged work-related gradual onset injury was the major cause of the symptoms indicated by Dr. Frigon. Consequently, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision must be, and hereby is, affirmed. [11] IT IS SO ORDERED.(1) proof by a preponderance of the evidence of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(E)(ii) (Repl. 1996); see also, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1996);
(2) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii) (Repl. 1996);
(3) medical evidence supported by objective findings, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16), establishing the injury (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(D) (Repl. 1996);
(4) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was caused by rapid repetitive motion (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii) (A) (Repl. 1996);
(5) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was the major cause of the disability or need for treatment (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(E)(ii) (Repl. 1996).
ELDON COFFMAN, Chairman MIKE WILSON, Commissioner
[12] Commissioner Humphrey dissents.