CATER v. AID TEMPORARY SERVICES, INC., 1995 AWCC 114

CLAIM NO. E404813

JEANNE CATER, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. AID TEMPORARY SERVICES, INC., EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT and CIGNA INSURANCE COMPANY, INSURANCE CARRIER, RESPONDENT

Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED MAY 12, 1995

Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Claimant represented by the HONORABLE SCOTT HUNTER, Attorney at Law, Jonesboro, Arkansas.

Respondents represented by the HONORABLE J. ROBIN NIX, Attorney at Law, Jonesboro, Arkansas.

Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Reversed.

[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] The respondents appeal an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on November 3, 1994. In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge found the claimant sustained a compensable injury. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that the claimant failed to satisfy the requirements necessary to prove that she sustained a compensable injury under the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Law, as amended by Act 796 of 1993. Therefore, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision must be reversed.

[3] The claimant began working for the respondent employer in September or October of 1993. After working at another location for one week, she was assigned to work at the Dana Plant. Transmissions are manufactured at the Dana Plant. At first, she worked putting parts on the top of transmissions and screwing down parts. However, after two months, she moved into another position on the line where bearings were placed in the casing on top of the transmission. The claimant testified that this job was more difficult than her other job. According to her testimony, placing the bearings required her to hammer down the bearings with a hammer that weighed approximately 3-5 pounds, and she testified that she did this all day. However, the testimony of her supervisor at Dana, Keith Dooley, is not entirely consistent with the claimant’s description of her duties. According to Mr. Dooley’s testimony, the claimant’s main duty involved hammering down the bearings. However, he also testified that only 5-6 minutes each day were spent hammering down bearings. During the remainder of the day, the claimant was involved in other activities on the assembly line.

[4] The claimant testified that she was hammering a bearing on February 14, 1994, when she experienced a burning pain which went up her arm and into her shoulder and neck. She also testified that the entire right side of her body became numb soon afterward. She continued to work for a time. However, she ultimately called the respondent employer, who advised her to report the injury to her supervisor. When she reported the injury to Mr. Dooley, he advised her to report to the human resources director. The human resources director was not in his office, but someone in the office advised her to write her name in the injury log, which she did. A copy of the injury log reflecting the claimant’s name is included in the record. Although Mr. Dooley testified that he did not recall the claimant reporting this incident to him, he also testified that he would have advised her to report to the human resources director.

[5] The respondent employer advised the claimant to See Dr. James Bradley, a family practitioner. The claimant presented to Dr. Bradley on February 14, 1994, with complaints of right shoulder and arm pain and numbness, and Dr. Bradley reached a tentative diagnosis of painful shoulder girdle syndrome and extensor tendonitis. She returned to Dr. Bradley three days later complaining that she was hurting all over her body, including “up her back and down her legs with numbness in both arms and legs.” However, according to Dr. Bradley, the symptoms described by the claimant “did not really match the findings. . . .” Nevertheless, Dr. Bradley gave the claimant “the benefit of doubt” and scheduled electrodiagnostic studies.

[6] The electrodiagnostic studies were conducted by Dr. David J. Marzewski on February 24, 1994. Although these studies revealed a “very mild right carpal tunnel syndrome,” they did not reveal any findings consistent with the symptoms related by the claimant. In this regard, Dr. Marzewski made the following comments:

Abnormal EMG (nerve conduction study plus needle examination) of the right upper extremity and cervical paraspinal muscles supportive of a very mild right medial mononeuropathy localized to the wrist. This is manifested by a mildly prolonged palmar latency only. The standard median sensory and motor conduction studies are normal. This finding supports a clinical diagnosis of a very mild right carpal tunnel syndrome. It could account for the numbness and tingling she experiences in her fingers, but it would not explain her neck and shoulder pain. There is no electrical evidence to support a right cervical radiculopathy within the C5 through T1 myotomes or a true neurogenic thoracic outlet syndrome. There is no electrical evidence for a left median mononeuropathy at the wrist.

[7] Dr. Bradley concluded that these “findings were totally inconsistent with the patient’s complaints.” In addition, Dr. Bradley made the following comments:

I felt that the results were that the patient has a very mild carpal tunnel syndrome and required nothing more than symptomatic treatment. As far as I am concerned, she should return to work. I do not feel there is any total disability from this. She may be sent back to work. This is a very common condition and is not surgical at this time and I feel there are no problems that would necessitate surgical intervention, time off from work, or any other treatment. I am not certain where the patient’s problem is; studies do not bear out her complaints.

[8] Since the claimant contends that he sustained an injury after July 1, 1993, this claim is controlled by the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Law as amended by Act 796 of 1993. Consequently, to establish the compensability of the claim, the claimant must satisfy the requirements for establishing one of the five categories of compensable injuries recognized by the amended law, including the requirements common to all categories of injuries. See, Jerry D. Reed v.Con Agra Frozen Foods, Full Workers’ Compensation Commission, opinion filed Feb. 2, 1995 (Claim No. E317744). The claimant in the present claim appears to contend alternatively that she sustained an injury either as a result of a specific incident which is identifiable by time and place of occurrence or as a result of rapid repetitive motion. To show that she sustained an injury as a result of a specific incident which is identifiable by time and place of occurrence, the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102
(5)(A)(i) (Cumm. Supp. 1993), the following requirements must be satisfied:

(1) proof by a preponderance of the evidence of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (5)(A)(i) (Cumm. Supp. 1993); Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (5)(E)(i) (Cumm. Supp. 1993); see also, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401
(a)(1) (Cumm. Supp. 1993));
(2) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body which required medical services or resulted in disability or death (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102
(5)(A)(i) (Cumm. Supp. 1993));
(3) medical evidence supported by objective findings, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (16), establishing the injury (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102
(5)(D) (Cumm. Supp. 1993));
(4) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (5)(A)(i) (Cumm. Supp. 1993)).

[9] To the extent she contends that she sustained an injury as a result of rapid repetitive motion, the following requirements must be satisfied:

(1) proof by a preponderance of the evidence of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102
(5)(A)(ii) (Cumm. Supp. 1993); Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (5)(E)(ii) (Cumm. Supp. 1993); see also,
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401 (a)(1) (Cumm. Supp. 1993));
(2) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102
(5)(A)(ii) (Cumm. Supp. 1993));
(3) medical evidence supported by objective findings, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102
(16), establishing the injury (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (5)(D) (Cumm. Supp. 1993));
(4) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was caused by rapid repetitive motion (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (5)(A)(ii)(a) (Cumm. Supp. 1993));
(5) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was the major cause of the disability or need for treatment (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102
(5)(E)(ii) (Cumm. Supp. 1993)).

[10] If the employee fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence any of the requirements for establishing the compensability of the injury alleged, he fails to establish the compensability of the claim, and compensation must be denied. Reed, supra.

[11] In the present claim, we find that the medical evidence fails to establish the injury alleged by the claimant. In this regard, the claimant contends that she is entitled to compensation due to pain she is experiencing in her neck and arm, as well as numbness all over her body. However, the only objective findings contained in the record were revealed by the electrodiagnostic studies, and Dr. Bradley and Dr. Marzewski both concluded that these findings were not consistent with the symptoms described by the claimant. Moreover, while the findings did reveal a very mild carpal tunnel syndrome, the medical evidence shows that carpal tunnel syndrome is not consistent with either the onset or the symptoms of the condition which the claimant contends resulted in her alleged disability. Therefore, we find that the injury alleged by the claimant is not established by the medical evidence, as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (5)(D).

[12] Accordingly, based on our de novo review of the entire record, and for the reasons discussed herein, we find that the claimant failed to satisfy the requirements necessary to establish a compensable injury under the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Law, as amended by Act 796 of 1993. Therefore, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision must be, and hereby is, reversed.

[13] IT IS SO ORDERED.

JAMES W. DANIEL, Chairman ALLYN C. TATUM, Commissioner

[14] Commissioner Humphrey dissents.