COLE v. AMOCO CORPORATION, 2002 AWCC 22

CLAIM NO. D503547

LORETTIA COLE, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. AMOCO CORPORATION, SELF-INSURED EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT NO. 1 DEATH AND PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY FUND, RESPONDENT NO. 2

Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
ORDER FILED JANUARY 24, 2002

Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Claimant represented by the HONORABLE H. OSCAR HIRBY, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Respondent No. 1 represented by the HONORABLE MICHAEL McCARTY-HARRISON, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Respondent No. 2 represented by the HONORABLE JUDY W. RUDD, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Decision of the Administrative Law Judge: Vacated and remanded.

ORDER
Respondent No. 1 appeals an opinion and order filed by the Administrative Law Judge on April 16, 2001. After conducting a de novo
review of the entire record, we vacate the Administrative Law Judge’s opinion and order and remand for clarification.

In this regard, the second paragraph of the reply brief of Respondent No. 1 states:

Administrative Law Judge Stiles’ April 16, 2001, Opinion was unclear in its findings. Amoco filed a notice of appeal of that Opinion, in part, to obtain clarification. Specifically, Amoco is unclear how in the same Opinion the administrative law judge could find that the July 20, 1995, Agreed Order would not be set aside and was binding on claimant and Amoco, that the benefits and penalties claimed by the claimant arose prior to the entry of the July 20, 1995, Agreed Order and were covered therein and therefore moot, but not allow Amoco credit toward its $75,000 maximum for the $32,769.35 the Agreed Order stipulated it paid in permanent total disability benefit payments. The Opinion gave no basis for such a decision and cited no evidence in support thereof.

We agree with Respondent No. 1 that it appears the Administrative Law Judge’s Finding No. 1 and the first paragraph of the Administrative Law Judge’s award are mathematically inconsistent in determining when the liability of Respondent No. 1 ends. In this regard, Finding No. 1 states:

1. The July 20, 1995 Agreed Order will not be set aside and is binding on the claimant and on Respondent No. 1.

However, the first paragraph of the Administrative Law Judge’s award states:

Respondent No. 1 is directed to pay the claimant permanent total disability benefits taking credit for a 7% and an additional 12% whole body impairment rating which was assessed and which was paid prior to May 11, 1994. Respondent No. 1 is to be credited with all payments commencing May 12, 1994 for permanent total disability benefits.

In essence, Respondent No. 1 appears to argue that, if the Administrative Law Judge intended Finding No. 1 to be consistent with his award, then he should have directed that Respondent No. 1 take a credit for $32,769.35 for payments made through the period July 1, 1995. We vacate the Administrative Law Judge’s decision and remand for more adequate findings on what appears to be an inconsistency between Finding No. 1 and the credit awarded to Respondent No. 1 against liability toward permanent total disability benefits in the “Award” section of the April 16, 2001 opinion and order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________ ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman
______________________________ MIKE WILSON, Commissioner
______________________________ SHELBY W. TURNER, Commissioner