CRAWFORD v. AREA AGENCY ON AGING, 1998 AWCC 384

CLAIM NO. E612996

VINNIE MAE CRAWFORD, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. AREA AGENCY ON AGING, EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT and RISK MANAGEMENT RESOURCES, INSURANCE CARRIER, RESPONDENT

Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED NOVEMBER 18, 1998

Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Claimant represented by the HONORABLE SARA M. SAWYER, Attorney at Law, Monticello, Arkansas.

Respondents represented by the HONORABLE R. SCOTT MORGAN, Attorney at Law, Pine Bluff, Arkansas.

Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Reversed.

[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] The respondents appeal an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on May 15, 1998. In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge found that the claimant sustained a compensable unexplained fall that arose out of her employment on August 16, 1996. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the claimant sustained an idiopathic fall on August 16, 1996, which is not compensable under the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Law. Therefore, we find that the decision of the administrative law judge must be reversed. [3] For an employee’s injury to be compensable under the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Law, it must result from an injury “arising (Repl. 1996). An injury occurs “in the course of employment” when it occurs “within the time and space boundaries of the employment, while the employee is carrying out the employer’s purpose, or advancing the employer’s interests directly or indirectly.” Cityof El Dorado v. Sartor, 21 Ark. App. 143, 729 S.W.2d 430 (1987). The phrase “arising out of the employment” refers to the origin or cause of the accident, so it must be shown that a causal connection exists between the injury and the employment. GerberProducts v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985). In order for an injury to arise out of the employment, it must be a natural or probable consequence or incident of the employment and a natural result of one of its risks. J G Cabinets v.Hennington, 269 Ark. 789, 600 S.W.2d 916 (Ark.App. 1980). [4] However, when an employee sustains an “unexplained” injury at work, the injury is compensable. By contrast, when an employee sustains an “idiopathic injury at work, the injury is, generally, not compensable because the injury is personal in nature, and therefore does not arise out of and in the course of employment.See generally, Little Rock Convention Visitors Bureau v. Pack, 60 Ark. App. 82, 959 S.W.2d 415 (1997). The Court of Appeals explained the distinction in Moore v. Darling Store Fixtures, 22 Ark. App. 21, 732 S.W.2d 496 (1987):

When one suffers an injury at work, the cause is, obviously, either known or unknown. Larson’s treatise on workers’ compensation law states that the most common example of a situation in which the cause of the harm is unknown is the unexplained fall in the course of employment and that most courts confronted with that situation have seen fit to award compensation. 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 10.31, at 3-87 (1985). However, injuries from idiopathic falls do not arise out of the employment unless the employment contributes to the risk or aggravates the injury by, for example, placing the employee in a position which increases the dangerous effect of the fall, such as on a height, near machinery or sharp corners, or in a moving vehicle. Larson § 12.11.
The word “idiopathic” is defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged (1976), as (1) peculiar to the individual, (2) arising spontaneously or from an obscure or unknown cause. Although the two concepts are frequently confused, Larson says “unexplained fall cases begin with a completely neutral origin of the mishap, while idiopathic-fall cases begin with an origin which is admittedly personal and which therefore requires some affirmative employment contribution to offset the prima facie showing of personal origin.” Larson § 12.11, at 3-314.

[5] Moore, 22 Ark. App. at 25, 732 S.W.2d at 498. [6] In the present case, the claimant was employed by the respondent-employer as a home health aide. On June 16, 1996, the claimant provided care to an elderly woman and the woman’s severely disabled son in their home. During the course of her shift that day, the claimant fell. According to the claimant, the elderly client heard the fall. The claimant could not get up, and she advised the elderly client to call the office and to call the claimant’s house. After a period, an ambulance was summoned which transported the claimant to the hospital. The claimant was ultimately diagnosed with a severely herniated disc in her neck and underwent surgery in September of 1996. [7] Initially, we note that the claimant has given various accounts at different times regarding the condition of the floor on which she fell and her own physical condition prior to the fall. Notably, in her deposition testimony given on May 21, 1997, the claimant testified that she had mopped the floor prior to her fall, and that she, in fact, cautioned the elderly client about coming out, after being cognizant of a wet floor. If accurate, this testimony could support a conclusion that there existed an affirmative employment contribution to the claimant’s fall. Likewise, the claimant testified in her May 21, 1997, deposition that she felt a pinch in her back while drawing a sheet over the younger client before her fall that day. If accurate, this testimony could also support a conclusion that there existed an affirmative employment contribution to the claimant’s subsequent fall. [8] However, somewhat contrary to the claimant’s 1997 deposition testimony and 1998 hearing testimony, the August 16, 1996, emergency room report in evidence contains a history that “I didn’t trip or anything, it felt like my legs gave out on me.” [Emphasis added]. Likewise, Robin King, a human resource manager for the respondent, testified that she called the claimant the day after the accident, and Ms. King testified as follows regarding that conversation:

Q. And what did Ms. Crawford tell you?

A. She told me that she was walking down the hallway and her knee gave out.
Q. Did she say she slipped on anything or fell over anything?

A. No, sir.

[9] [Emphasis Added]. In addition, the claimant gave the following answers in a recorded statement on August 26, 1996, ten days after her fall at work:

Q. Okay, can you tell me what happened?

A. [S]o, I was going to Mr. Adams’ room to look in on him first to see if he was asleep, or did he need anything, so when I went to his room, I didn’t go all the way in his room, because when I looked in the door, he was asleep, so I turned around at his door and was coming back to check on Ms. Adams to see if she was asleep, so when I got to her door, when I turned around in Mr. Adams’ door to come back, I really don’t know if I fainted, or if I blacked out, or what happened, but when I got back — when I turned around, when I knew anything, I was down on the floor, and my hand was up under my head . . .

. . .

Q. It’s scary, isn’t it?

A. It sure is, because I couldn’t get myself together, what happened and how it happened. You know, it took a while for me to realize what did I do, and I know that I didn’t have anything in my hand, I hadn’t mopped the floor, I hadn’t — the floor wasn’t wet, wasn’t nothing on the floor that I could have slipped or tripped over, and that’s the reason I couldn’t understand what happened, and that is the first time that I had ever fallen in my life.

[Emphasis added]. [10] On this record, as did the administrative law judge, we accord greater weight to the claimant’s August 26, 1996, recorded history of the events of August 16, 1996, than the weight we accord the claimant’s subsequent deposition and hearing testimony regarding the condition of the floor at the time of her fall. Likewise, in light of the major discrepancy between the claimant’s recorded statement and her subsequent testimony about the condition of the floor, we also accord no weight to the claimant’s testimony that she had experienced a back pinch prior to the fall. [11] In addition, on this record, we find that the credible evidence establishes that the claimant’s fall was, admittedly personal in origin. In this regard, the claimant’s various accounts of the incident and her conversation with Ms. Adams immediately after the incident, indicate that the claimant was conscious and lucid at the time the fall occurred and immediately after the fall occurred. Likewise, the claimant’s nearly contemporaneous August 26, 1996, recorded statement indicates that there was nothing on the floor, the floor was not wet, and the claimant did not slip or trip. [12] While the claimant does not know, and probably never can know, exactly what biomechanical mechanism caused her legs to give way at the precise moment that she fell, we find that the emergency room report, the testimony of Ms. King, and the claimant’s own August 26, 1996, testimony, establish a prima facie showing that the claimant’s fall was caused by a purely personal origin (the claimant’s legs simply giving way). Furthermore, since we do not find credible the claimant’s testimony that her fall occurred on a wet floor or after a back pinch, we also find that there is no credible evidence in the record of any affirmative employment contribution to the claimant’s fall. Consequently, we find that the greater weight of the credible evidence establishes that the claimant’s fall was idiopathic. Finally, we note that the claimant’s fall occurred on a level surface, and there is simply no evidence to conclude that there was present any stairs, etc., which might have increased the risk of the claimant’s sustaining a fall, or which would have placed the claimant in a position which might have increased the dangerous effect of the fall. Therefore, on this record, we are constrained to find that the claimant in the present case sustained a non-compensable idiopathic fall. [13] Consequently, after conducting a de novo review of the entire record, and for the reasons discussed herein, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision must be, and hereby is, reversed. [14] IT IS SO ORDERED. [15] _______________________________
ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman

_______________________________ MIKE WILSON, Commissioner

[16] Commissioner Humphrey dissents.