DUNAHOO v. AMERICAN PIONEER, INC., 1997 AWCC 288

CLAIM NO. E603882

PEGGY DUNAHOO, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. AMERICAN PIONEER, INC., EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT and ITT HARTFORD INSURANCE CO., INSURANCE CARRIER, RESPONDENT

Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED JULY 9, 1997

Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Claimant represented by the HONORABLE DAVID McGEHEE, Attorney at Law, Jonesboro, Arkansas.

Respondents represented by the HONORABLE WILLIAM C. FRYE, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed.

[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] The claimant appeals an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on September 18, 1996. In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge found that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable injury. Based upon our de novo review of the evidence presented in this case, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision must be affirmed.

[3] The respondent apparently, among other things, provides loan and insurance services to various banks. Consequently, the respondent receives large volumes of mail from these banks enclosing an assortment of loan documents and related items. The claimant was hired by the respondent on November 1, 1995, and was assigned the job of mail clerk. The claimant’s tasks included filing, mail sorting, date stamping incoming mail, and related activities.

[4] The claimant testified that her work day began at 8:00 a.m. Upon reporting to work, the claimant and her co-workers (usually numbering two but occasionally only one) would begin doing routine filing. When the mail arrived, usually at 9:15 or 9:30, the envelopes from various banks would be logged in and assigned to the claimant and her co-workers for processing. The claimant was then required to open each envelope, remove all documents inside, and date stamp each item received. After each page had been date stamped, the documents would then be alphabetized and placed in an accordion sorter. This process would then be repeated until all of the envelopes had been opened. A review of the testimony of the claimant and two other witnesses who were familiar with the claimant’s tasks, as well as the mail logs, indicated that on the average the claimant would process approximately 20 envelopes each day, and occasionally as many as 50. The testimony varied somewhat as to the number of documents in each envelope, but it would appear each envelope contained between 25 and 100 documents. The sorting process was usually not completed until approximately 2:00 p.m., when the claimant and her co-workers would occupy themselves by performing additional filing for the remainder of the work day.

[5] The claimant first sought medical treatment for left wrist swelling on January 24, 1996, approximately three days after she pounded on a jar at home. According to the claimant, she was off work for a period in March of 1996, and she began to experience symptoms in her right wrist during that period. The claimant was subsequently diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. The claimant contends that her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome arose as a result of job-related activities for the respondent.

[6] Since the claimant contends that she sustained an injury after July 1, 1993, this claim is controlled by the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Law as amended by Act 796 of 1993. Consequently, to establish the compensability of the claim, the claimant must satisfy the requirements for establishing one of the five categories of compensable injuries recognized by the amended law, including the requirements common to all categories of injuries. See, Jerry D. Reed v. Con Agra Frozen Foods, Full Workers’ Compensation Commission, opinion filed Feb. 2, 1995 (Claim No. E317744). In the present claim, the claimant does not contend that her injury was caused by a specific incident and identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Instead, she contends that she sustained an injury as a result of repetitive motion. Consequently, the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii)(a) (Repl. 1996) are controlling, and the following must be satisfied:

(1) proof by a preponderance of the evidence of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii) (Repl. 1996); Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(E)(ii) (Repl. 1996); see also, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1996));
(2) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii) (Repl. 1996));
(3) medical evidence supported by objective findings, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16), establishing the injury (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(D) (Repl. 1996));
(4) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was caused by rapid repetitive motion (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A) (ii)(a) (Repl. 1996));
(5) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was the major cause of the disability or need for treatment (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(E)(ii) (Repl. 1996)).

[7] If the employee fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence any of the requirements for establishing the compensability of the injury alleged, she fails to establish the compensability of the claim, and compensation must be denied.Reed, supra.

[8] In the present claim, there is testimony from the claimant, as well as two other witnesses who had performed the same job for the respondents, as to the specific tasks involved in the claimant’s employment. The testimony of the claimant and the witnesses was consistent regarding the specific job functions. However, their opinions diverged as to whether or not the tasks would be considered rapid or repetitive. The witnesses called by the respondents, Pauline Hutcherson, the person hired by the respondents to replace the claimant and Martha Walker, the claimant’s immediate superior who would sometimes fill in for the mail clerks when they were absent, were of the opinion that the job did not call for rapid or repetitive motion and was not particularly hand intensive. In fact, Ms. Hutcherson stated that she had been diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome from a prior job but that her employment with the respondents did not cause her symptoms to reappear. Both of these witnesses emphasized that there was not a great deal of time pressure placed upon them in performing this job. They also stated that the tasks being performed alternated between file stamping, alphabetizing, and other sorting. However, the claimant contends that both the sorting and the date stamping were hand intensive and the tasks that were performed were in a rapid, repetitive fashion.

[9] We find that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that any injury that she may have sustained as a result of her work-related duties was the major cause of her disability or need for medical treatment. In reaching our decision, we initially note that the claimant’s mail clerk duties (opening envelopes, date stamping, sorting, and filing) involved very minimal potential for any strain or repetitive trauma to either wrist. Although the claimant asserts that her date-stamping duties and sorting duties caused her carpal tunnel syndrome, we note that nothing in the record suggests that using an ink stamp involves any rapid or repetitive motion of the wrist or hands, or otherwise caused any types of strain or trauma to the claimant’s wrist or hands. Moreover, we note that the claimant’s date-stamping involved the left handonly, although the claimant has been diagnosed with bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome. Likewise, we note that the claimant’s left wrist symptoms developed shortly after a jar incident at home involving the left wrist, and we note that the claimant’s right wrist symptoms developed during a period that the claimant was off work. To the extent that the claimant asserts that her sorting duties caused or contributed to her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, we note that these duties apparently involved little more than lifting extremely light objects (pieces of paper) and arranging the papers in alphabetical order. After reviewing the testimony of the claimant and the other witnesses describing the claimant’s office duties, we conclude that the claimant’s date stamping, sorting and filing duties involved essentially no type of potentially injury-inducing trauma to either of the claimant’s upper extremities.

[10] In reaching our decision, we also note that an accurate description of the claimant’s work load and job duties was provided to the claimant’s treating orthopedic physician, Dr. Henry Stroope. During the course of Dr. Stroope’s deposition, Dr. Stroope indicated that, in his opinion, the degree of activity performed by the claimant would not likely have caused the bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome that the claimant has experienced. Dr. Stroope was of the opinion that those types of activities undertaken by the claimant were not of sufficient intensity to have caused the development of the claimant’s condition. The doctor thought it significant that a co-worker previously diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome was able to perform these same tasks without the recurrence of carpal tunnel symptoms. Dr. Stroope also opined that carpal tunnel syndrome frequently develops without any clear cause, and Dr. Stroope acknowledged that a number of risk factors were present that would have created a propensity for the claimant’s developing carpal tunnel syndrome. These factors included her diabetic condition, her smoking, and her obesity.

[11] Therefore, after conducting a de novo review of the entire record, and for the reasons discussed herein, we find that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any work-related injury that she may have sustained was the major cause of her disability or her need for medical treatment. Therefore, we find that the decision of the administrative law judge must be, and hereby is, affirmed.

[12] IT IS SO ORDERED.

ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman MIKE WILSON, Commissioner

[13] Commissioner Humphrey dissents.