CLAIM NO. F303987
Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED JUNE 4, 2004
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by HONORABLE JOHN BARTTELT, Attorney at Law, Jonesboro, Arkansas.
Respondents represented by HONORABLE MARK MAYFIELD, Attorney at Law, Jonesboro, Arkansas.
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge: Reversed.
OPINION AND ORDER
Claimant appeals the decision of the Administrative Law Judge filed November 12, 2003 finding that claimant’s injury was not a compensable injury that arose out of and in the course of employment as defined by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A). After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that the Administrative Law Judge erred in denying Claimant’s entitlement to benefits because Claimant was acting within the course and scope of her employment. Therefore, we reverse the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.
History
The Claimant, Sandra Hampton, was employed as a Registered Nurse (R.N.) in the intensive care unit (ICU) of the Arkansas Methodist Medical Center in Paragould, Arkansas. She worked a twelve-hour shift from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. Claimant was paid for a full twelve hour shift, with no scheduled break or lunch period. Claimant clocked in at 6:45 a.m. each day and immediately began working, reviewing reports from the outgoing shift of nurses and accepting assignments for two patients per nurse per shift. The ICU is an eight patient unit and there are four licensed nurses who are each assigned two patients. Claimant’s job assignment was to visually check each patient at various intervals, to review the patients’ charts and observe their monitors throughout the day.
Since there were no scheduled breaks or lunch periods, Claimant testified that the routine practice was for the nurses to take turns picking up food from the hospital cafeteria around 7:15 each morning to be eaten while watching their patients’ monitors and catching up on charting.
On the morning of December 12, 2002, it was Claimant’s turn to pick up breakfast for the other nurses. Claimant was injured while going downstairs to the cafeteria to purchase breakfast for herself and her co-workers. She tripped on a metal transport cart that was left in front of a stairwell door and fell sustaining a serious hip injury.
Claimant acknowledged that there was no prohibition against employees bringing food into the hospital and into their work station in the ICU. Likewise, Kelly Blake, the Human Resources Director for Respondent, testified that Respondent does not require the nurses in the ICU unit to go to the cafeteria, although they are allowed to do so. Ms. Blake also stated that Respondent paid the employees during their short breaks and for lunch even though a thirty minute lunch break is not provided during the twelve-hour shift.
The Claimant testified that she suffered injuries as a result of the December 12, 2002 accident which required medical treatment, including surgery that resulted in a period of temporary total disability. Respondents argued that the accident suffered by Claimant occurred at a time when the Claimant was not performing employment services.
Analysis
To qualify for workers’ compensation benefits, Claimant must satisfy the four requirements of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1997). Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-102 (5) (A) (Repl. 1997) defines “compensable injury” as “an accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm . . . arising out of and in the course of employment.” The test for determining whether an employee is acting “within the course of employment” is whether the injury occurred “within time and space boundaries of employment, when the employee is carrying out the employer’s purpose or advancing the employer’s interests directly or indirectly.” Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997). See Also Collins v. Excel Specialty Products, 347 Ark. 811 at 817 (2002); Pifer v. Single Source Transportation, 347 Ark. 851, 69 S.W.3d 1 (2002).
The Administrative Law Judge found that Claimant was not performing “employment services” at the time of her injury because the hospital did not mandate its employees to purchase food in the cafeteria and because the cafeteria was not on the same floor as the ICU. We find that these facts are not relevant to the issue of whether she was performing employment services. First, the Respondent required the ICU nurses to work a twelve hour shift with no scheduled breaks or lunches. The Claimant could not have left the premises to eat at a restaurant or to go home for lunch. The Respondent must have known that its employees would eat at their work-stations since it paid them to do so. Respondent could not have reasonably expected that its employees would not eat for a twelve-hour period and should have expected that employees would utilize the hospital cafeteria.
The claimant was directly benefitting Respondent by getting breakfast for the other ICU nurses. The nurses’ practice of rotating the buying of food from the cafeteria was established for the benefit of the patients so that only one nurse would be away from the ICU at a time. This practice carried out the employer’s purpose of offering quality patient care. Obviously, it is better for one employee to be away from the ICU than four at a time. Clearly, Claimant was within the time and space boundaries of her employment when she retrieved breakfast for her coworkers. She did not leave the hospital and she was subject to being interrupted while purchasing breakfast if she had been asked for assistance from another employee or patient.
In a similar case, Ray v. University of Arkansas, 66 Ark. App. 177, 990 S.W.2d 558 (1999), the Claimant was a cafeteria worker who was paid for her fifteen-minute breaks because she was required to cease her personal activities if a student needed help. The Claimant was reaching for an apple for personal consumption during her break period when she slipped and fell. The Court of Appeals held that the claimant was performing employment services at the time she was injured based on the fact that she was paid for her fifteen-minute breaks and was required to assist student diners if the need arose. Her employer gleaned benefit from her being present and required to aid students on her break.
The facts in Ray are very similar to the facts in this case and should be decided based on the same analysis. The University of Arkansas required Ray to be available to work during her break and paid her for the time she was on break, presumably because she was required to help students. The University of Arkansas was clearly benefitted by Ray’s being in the cafeteria and available for students during her paid break. The benefit was directly related to the job that Ray performed and for which she was paid. Although she was on a break, Ray was required to be available to help students and was paid for her time. Ray was providing employment services despite the fact that her fall occurred when she was going to get an apple for herself during a paid break rather than going to serve a student.
Like Ray, Claimant was on the clock, but she did not have a scheduled break or meal period. The nature of Claimant’s job required that she remain at her work station for a full twelve hours. Therefore, the expectation was that Claimant and her coworkers would eat at their workstations. This benefitted the employer by having employees present at all times to monitor patients.
The Administrative Law Judge’s other cited reasons for denying benefits to the Claimant are that the hospital did not require the nurses to eat in the cafeteria and that the cafeteria was on a separate floor. However, this analysis ignores the fact that the hospital required the nurses to work a twelve-hour shift with no allowances for breaks or meals. The Claimant was paid for twelve straight hours because the Respondent expected her to be on duty and advancing its interests no matter where she was in the hospital. Likewise, the Respondent knew and accepted the ICU nurses’ practice of eating at their work stations and actually paid them to do so. Based on the foregoing, we find that the Claimant was acting within the time and space boundaries of employment and was performing employment services when she sustained her injuries. All accrued benefits shall be paid in a lump sum without discount and with interest thereon at the lawful rate from the date of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-809 (Repl. 2002).
Since the claimant’s injury occurred after July 1, 2001, the claimant’s attorney’s fee is governed by the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715
as amended by Act 1281 of 2001. Compare Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715(Repl. 1996) with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 (Repl. 2002). For prevailing on this appeal before the Full Commission, claimant’s attorney is hereby awarded an additional attorney’s fee in the amount of $500.00 in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715(b) (Repl. 2002).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________ OLAN W. REEVES, Chairman
______________________________ SHELBY W. TURNER, Commissioner
Commissioner McKinney dissents.