CLAIM NO. F002376

ROSA HERNANDEZ, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. OK FOODS, INC., SELF-INSURED EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT

Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED MAY 8, 2001

Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Claimant represented by the HONORABLE GUNNER DELAY, Attorney at Law, Fort Smith, Arkansas.

Respondents represented by the HONORABLE TOM HARPER, JR., Attorney at Law, Fort Smith, Arkansas.

Decision of administrative law judge: Reversed.

OPINION AND ORDER
The claimant appeals to the Full Workers’ Compensation Commission an administrative law judge’s opinion filed December 7, 2000. The administrative law judge found that the claimant failed to prove that she was temporarily and totally disabled from March 3, 2000 to a date to be determined. After de novo review of the entire record, the Full Commission reverses the opinion of the administrative law judge. We find that the claimant proved that she was entitled to temporary total disability compensation from February 9, 2000 through July 5, 2000.

I. HISTORY

Rosa Ivel Hernandez-Aguilar, age 44, became employed with OK Foods, Inc. on September 28, 1999. On October 28, 1999, Ms. Hernandez presented to Dr. Joseph A. Bylak with complaints of bilateral wrist and hand pain. Dr. Bylak, an orthopaedic surgeon, diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury in the form of carpal tunnel syndrome, and that the respondent paid medical expenses.

The claimant asserted that the compensable injury prevented her from performing her work duties for the respondent-employer beginning February 9, 2000. She testified through an interpreter:

Q. Did she ever talk to anybody at OK Foods to explain why she left?
A. No. When I went to pick up my employment check — the supervisor came out and gave her the check and asked her why she had left her job, and she told her her hands were hurting. Then why didn’t she tell her, that the company could send her to a doctor. She said that she couldn’t respond in English to the supervisor, so she just nodded her head no. . . .

Q. Why did she terminate her employment?

A. Her hands were hurting. She just couldn’t work comfortably. It was a very difficult pain. She couldn’t stand it.

Dr. Bylak saw the claimant on February 23, 2000 and diagnosed “Bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, right worse than left.” A nerve conduction study done February 25, 2000 was abnormal (the medical records conflict as to whether this was a bilateral study or only on the right). On March 3, 2000, Dr. Bylak scheduled surgery and wrote, “she is unable to work secondary to her right wrist carpal tunnel syndrome.” Dr. Bylak saw the claimant on April 20, 2000 and diagnosed “Bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, status post right open carpal tunnel release.” Dr. Bylak also diagnosed “Left middle finger trigger finger.”

Dr. Bylak wrote to the respondent on April 25, 2000:

Ms. Hernandez would have been placed on light duties with work restrictions for carpal tunnel syndrome if she had still been working at the time of her treatment. After surgery on her right wrist for an open carpal tunnel release, she would have been returned to work the following day for one-handed duties of light duty with the left wrist only.

On May 17, 2000, Dr. Bylak performed a left carpal tunnel release on the extremity he previously said the claimant could use at work.

Ms. Hernandez claimed entitlement to additional worker’s compensation. The claimant contended that she sustained a bilateral carpal tunnel injury on or about October 1, 1999. The claimant contended that she was entitled to temporary total disability compensation from March 3, 2000 to a date yet to be determined. The respondents contended that the claimant was not entitled to temporary total disability.

Dr. Bylak wrote on July 5, 2000:

Ms. Hernandez is here for follow-up of her bilateral carpal tunnel releases. Her incisions have healed very well now. She has no swelling or tenderness about the wrists. She has normal range of motion in the wrists, fingers and thumb. . . .
She is discharged from my care. She is to return to work with no restrictions. She is without disability.

After a hearing before the Commission, the administrative law judge found that the claimant failed to prove that she was “temporarily and totally disabled from March 3, 2000, to a date to be determined.” The administrative law judge determined that the claimant “voluntarily quit” her job and did not inquire into light duty with the employer. The administrative law judge therefore denied the claim for temporary total disability; claimant appeals to the Full Commission.

II. ADJUDICATION

The administrative law judge found that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to temporary total disability compensation from March 3, 2000 to a date to be determined. The administrative law judge cited the standard for non-scheduled injuries as announced in Arkansas State Highway and TransportationDepartment v. Breshears, 272 Ark. 244, 613 S.W.2d 392 (1981), and implicitly determined that the claimant failed to prove that she was “totally incapacitated to earn wages.” The administrative law judge erred as a matter of law. The claimant sustained bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, a scheduled injury. Hallsell v. Levi Strauss Co., Workers’ Compensation Commission E113512 E101707 (March 7, 1995). The claimant is therefore entitled to temporary total disability compensation while she is within her healing period and has not returned to work. See, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-521(a) (Supp. 1999); Wheeler Construction Co. v.Armstrong, 73 Ark. App. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2001).

In the present matter, Dr. Bylak diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome in October, 1999. The parties stipulated that the claimant sustained a compensable injury in the form of carpal tunnel syndrome. The claimant credibly testified that she left her employment on February 9, 2000, because her hands were hurting. “It was a very difficult pain,” she testified. The administrative law judge discussed Dr. Bylak’s letter, written nearly two months after surgery, indicating that he would have placed the claimant on light work duty the day after her carpal tunnel release, “if she had still been working at the time of her treatment.” The Commission is entitled to review the basis for a doctor’s opinion in deciding the weight and credibility of the opinion and medical evidence. Maverick Transp. v. Buzzard, 69 Ark. App. 128, 10 S.W.3d 467 (2000). We are unable to determine from this record how the claimant could have continued to perform even light duty with her injured left hand while recuperating from her right-side surgical wound.

Applying Act 796 of 1993 to the facts of the present matter, the Full Commission finds that the claimant proved that she was entitled to temporary total disability compensation from February 9, 2000 through July 5, 2000. This represents the period that the claimant was within her healing period for her admittedly compensable injury and had not returned to work. The claimant credibly testified that she had to leave work on February 9, 2000, due to her compensable injury. Dr. Bylak opined on July 5, 2000 that the claimant had healed from her surgeries, and he discharged her from further treatment. The Full Commission finds that the claimant reached the end of her healing period by July 5, 2000. Temporary disability cannot be awarded after the healing period has ended. Trader v. Single Source Transportation, Workers’ Compensation Commission E507484 (Feb. 12, 1999).

Based on our de novo review of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that the claimant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to temporary total disability compensation from February 9, 2000 through July 5, 2000. The decision of the administrative law judge is reversed.

All accrued benefits shall be paid in a lump sum without discount and with interest thereon at the lawful rate from the date of the administrative law judge’s decision in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-809 (Repl. 1996).

For prevailing on this appeal before the Full Commission, claimant’s attorney is hereby awarded an additional attorney’s fee in the amount of $250.00 in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715 (Repl. 1996).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

________________________________ ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman
________________________________ SHELBY W. TURNER, Commissioner

Commissioner Wilson dissents.

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