HORNADAY v. SMITH ROBERTS TIMBER COMPANY, 1996 AWCC 35

CLAIM NO. D807079

GERALDINE HORNADAY, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. SMITH ROBERTS TIMBER COMPANY, EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT, CIGNA, INSURANCE CARRIER, RESPONDENT

Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 6, 1996

Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Claimant appears pro se on appeal before the Full Commission.

Respondents represented by the HONORABLE MICHAEL PICKENS, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

[1] ORDER
[2] This matter comes before the Full Commission on the respondents’ motion to dismiss the claimant’s appeal. After consideration of the respondents’ motion, the claimant’s response, and all other matters properly before the Commission, we find that the respondents’ motion must be denied.

[3] The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Law allows parties to petition the Full Commission for review of an order or award of an administrative law judge. The applicable statute governing the time for filing an appeal to the Full Commission states the following:

A compensation order or award of an administrative law judge or a single commissioner shall become final unless a party to the dispute shall, within thirty (30) days from the receipt by him of the order or award, petition in writing for a review by the full commission of the order or award.

[4] Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-711 (a)(1) (1987). The procedural requirements set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-711 (a)(1) are mandatory and jurisdictional, and consequently, must be strictly complied with. Cooper Industrial Products v. Meadows, 5 Ark. App. 205, 634 S.W.2d 670 (1986). Therefore, the decision of the administrative law judge becomes final, and the Full Commission cannot review the decision unless a “petition for review” is received within the thirty day period set forth in the statute. [5] In the present case, the administrative law judge filed an opinion and order on October 30, 1995, denying the claimant’s claim for additional medical benefits and additional temporary disability compensation. The claimant received a copy of the administrative law judge’s decision on November 3, 1995. On November 30, 1995, the Commission received a letter from the claimant regarding her claim. The Commission processed the claimant’s letter as a petition for review, and upon notification of a briefing schedule, the respondents filed their motion to dismiss the claimant’s appeal. The respondents contend that the letter received by the Commission on November 30, 1995, is inadequate to state an “appeal”, and that later correspondence from the claimant was not timely filed within the 30 day period set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-711 (a)(1). In response, the claimant contends that she was aware of the 30 day deadline when she mailed her letter, and that she intended her original letter as an “appeal” to the Full Commission. [6] The letter received by the Commission from the claimant on November 30, 1995, begins:

To Whom It May Concern:

My name is Geraldine Hornaday. On August 23, 1995 I appeared before Judge Lewis D. Smith, case # WCD807079, at which time I lost. Anyhow I appealed to him he said it was out of his jurisdiction, I needed to write the full commission. So here goes. . . . I thought [my attorney] worked for me, but evidently not, because she wouldn’t even appeal this like I asked. It probably won’t do any good, but I sure wish ya’ll would help me understand at least understand why. So here goes!

[7] In addition to the introduction quoted above, the claimant’s six page letter goes on to identify and discuss several issues of fact and law related to her claim and addressed in the administrative law judge’s opinion and order denying the additional benefits she has requested. In addition, we note that the letter was sent by certified mail in an envelope addressed to the attention of the “Full Commission”. [8] We note that the respondents did not file a brief, or any citation to legal authority, in support of their contention that the claimant’s letter does not state an “appeal”. While it appears that no court has addressed the minimum requirements under Arkansas law to state an adequate “petition for review”, inCook v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 21 Ark. App. 29, 727 S.W.2d 862 (1987), the Arkansas Court of Appeals discussed the minimum requirements necessary for correspondence to the Commission to constitute a claim for additional compensation for the purposes of tolling the applicable statute of limitations. In that case, the court held that an attorney’s correspondence notifying the Commission that he has been employed to assist a claimant in connection with unpaid benefits is sufficient to state a claim for additional compensation where the correspondence also lists the claimant’s name, the employer’s name, and the WCC file number. Id., See also Garrett v. Sears,Roebuck Co., 43 Ark. App. 37, 858 S.W.2d 146 (1993). Moreover, we have interpreted Cook as requiring that correspondence intended as a claim for additional benefits (1) identify the claimant, (2) indicate that a compensable injury has occurred, and (3) convey the idea that compensation is expected. R. L.Martin v. Hamlin Seed Company, Full Workers’ Compensation Commission, June 8, 1993 (Claim No. D901716). [9] In the present claim, we find that the claimant’s letter received by the Commission on November 30, 1995, identifies (1) the claimant, (2) the administrative law judge, (3) the claim number, and (4) the relevant hearing date. In addition, we find that the claimant’s letter conveys the general idea that she requests the Full Commission to review the administrative law judge’s decision in her claim. Without attempting to determine the absolute minimum requirements necessary for an adequate petition for review, we find that claimant’s letter received November 30, 1995, adequately petitions for review of the administrative law judge’s decision in her claim. Because the correspondence was timely filed within the 30 day period prescribed by statute, we also find that the respondents’ motion to dismiss the claimant’s appeal must be, and hereby is, denied. [10] IT IS SO ORDERED.

JAMES W. DANIEL, Chairman PAT WEST HUMPHREY, Commissioner ALICE L. HOLCOMB, Commissioner