CLAIM NO. E114843
Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED AUGUST 26, 1999
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE DAVID STUBBS, Attorney at Law, Dumas, Arkansas.
Respondents represented by the HONORABLE GUY A. WADE, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Decision of the Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed as modified.
[1] OPINION AND ORDER[2] The respondent appeals an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on October 15, 1998. In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge found that the claimant is entitled to an award of $1500.00 in compensation for permanent facial disfigurement. In addition, the administrative law judge found that the claimant has been rendered totally permanently disabled as a result of his August 30, 1991 compensable injury pursuant to the odd lot doctrine, and the administrative law judge found that the present claim is not barred by the statute of limitations. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision must be affirmed as modified. [3] The claimant sustained an admittedly compensable injury on August 30, 1991. The injury occurred when the claimant was delivering gasoline products to one of the employer’s customers and a vehicle backfire caused a gasoline explosion. As a result of that explosion, the claimant suffered burns over approximately 43% of his body. For treatment of those injuries, the claimant was hospitalized for a period of approximately 90 days and underwent twelve skin graft surgeries. [4] Eventually, the claimant’s physician opined that the claimant had sustained a 20% anatomical impairment to his body as a whole as a result of his scarring and other skin damage. The respondent accepted that impairment rating and paid the claimant permanent impairment benefits based upon it. The issues presented for determination at the present time are the claimant’s entitlement to benefits for facial disfigurement and for additional permanent disability benefits. In this regard, the claimant contends that scarring on his face entitles him to an award of benefits for facial disfigurement pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-524, and that his injuries have rendered him permanently and totally disabled. The respondent denies that the claimant is entitled to any additional benefits on the basis that the statute of limitation has expired and acts as a bar to any claim by the claimant. In the alternative, the respondent contends that the claimant is not entitled to any benefits for facial disfigurement since the respondent asserts that those benefits were part of the 20% impairment which they previously paid to the claimant. The respondent further denies that the claimant is entitled to any wage loss disability benefits on the basis that there are jobs available which the claimant could perform were it not for a lack of motivation. [5] I. Statute of Limitations. [6] The respondent asserts that the statute of limitations set out in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702 (b) acts as a bar to the present claim. The respondents appear to base this argument on two alternative theories. First, although the claimant filed an admittedly timely claim in 1993, the respondent asserts that the 1993 claim was administratively dismissed by the Commission in 1996. Second, the respondents seem to argue in the alternative that, even if the claimant’s 1993 claim was not administratively dismissed in 1996, the claim should have been deemed dismissed prior to 1996 by operation of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a)(4). [7] With regard to the respondent’s assertion that the claimant’s 1993 claim was administratively dismissed by the Commission in 1996, we are constrained to note that the respondent has failed to offer into the record a copy of any alleged dismissal order. Consequently, we are also constrained to find that the evidence in the record does not support a finding that the claimant’s 1993 claim was administratively dismissed by the Commission in 1996, as the respondent asserts. Therefore, we do not reach any issues as to what bearing, if any, that a 1996 administrative dismissal order might have had on the statute of limitations issue presented in this case. [8] To the extent that the respondent seems to assert, in the alternative, that the claimant’s 1993 claim should have been deemed dismissed (without a Commission order) by operation of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a)(4), we reject the respondents’ interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a)(4) as applied to this case for two reasons. First, the respondents have failed to cite any authority, nor are we aware of any authority, indicating that Section 702(a)(4) ever operated to deem claims dismissed with no action on the part of the Commission. Second, and more important, the record establishes that the claimant, in fact, requested a hearing contemporaneous with filing his timely claim in 1993. Therefore, Section 702(a)(4) would appear to simply have no application to the circumstances of the present case, since the claimant clearly did file a request for a hearing within 6 months of filing a claim when the claimant filed a contemporaneous hearing request with his claim filing. [9] On this record, we are constrained by judicial precedent to find that the statute of limitations does not bar the claimant’s claim. See, Arkansas Power and Light v. Giles, 20 Ark. App. 154, 725 S.W.2d 583 (1987); Sisney v. Leisure Lodge, Inc., 17 Ark. App. 96, 704 S.W.2d 173 (1986); Bledsoe v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 12 Ark. App. 293, 675 S.W.2d 849 (1984). [10] II. Facial Disfigurement Benefits. [11] The respondent also asserts that payment of the claimant’s 20% anatomical impairment rated to the whole body satisfies any claim the claimant may have had for facial scarring or disfigurement. Benefits for facial disfigurement are set out in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-524 (1987). This section provides that the Commission shall award compensation for serious and permanent facial or head disfigurement in a sum not to exceed $3,500.00. The statute goes on to provide that no award for disfigurement shall be entered until twelve months after the injury. [12] We believe the intent of the statute is to provide a claimant some compensation for the personal effects of facial scarring apart from benefits for anatomical impairment under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-522. In this regard, we note that the disfigurement statute at one time contained a provision that facial disfigurement benefits were based solely on the effect that disfigurement had on the future earning capacity of the injured worker in similar employment. See, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1313(g) (1960 Repl.) However, that requirement was deleted prior to the claimant’s injury. As the statute read at the time of the claimant’s injury, there was no longer any requirement that the facial scarring or disfigurement have any relationship whatsoever to earning capacity or anatomical impairment. We hold that the benefits provided for in this particular statute are intended to be in addition to those for anatomical impairment or disability. [13] There was no appeal from the claimant as to the amount of the judge’s award for disfigurement benefits. Further, the record does indicate that the claimant suffered severe burns to the left side of his face and ear and that these burns did cause a significant amount of scarring. We find the monetary award by the judge is reasonable and affirm in all respects. [14] III. Permanent Disability Benefits. [15] The claimant testified that he entered the military in 1954 and did not return to the civilian work force until 1964. For the next several years, he was employed in various truck driving capacities. At the time of the accident, the claimant had been employed with the respondent employer for over nine years and was 59 years of age. The claimant also testified he began drawing Social Security retirement benefits when he reached the age of 62 and, on the date of the hearing, he was two days short of his 66th birthday. [16] There is no doubt that the claimant in this case suffered very severe burns. Photographs taken at the hospital emergency room upon his arrival there reflect that he has very severe injuries over a substantial portion of his body, including his legs, arms, back, chest, and head. As noted by the claimant’s treating physicians, these burns covered approximately 43% of his skin surface. For treatment of these injuries, the claimant underwent a period of hospitalization in excess of 90 days and underwent numerous surgeries. He also wore special protective clothing and bandages for a period of almost two years before being released by his treating physician. In assessing the claimant a 20% anatomical impairment rating, Dr. Robert Love, his treating physician, stated that the disability was due to the claimant’s intolerance to heat and cold and his painful scars. [17] The record contained extensive testimony from the claimant regarding his limitations as a result of his injuries. He confirmed that extremes of temperature cause him considerable problems. Exposure of the skin to hot or cold temperatures causes severe pain and discomfort. In fact, one of the witnesses, Ms. Brenda Johnson, the claimant’s sister, testified that he passed out on at least one occasion while sitting in her yard on a hot day. [18] In regard to his driving ability, the claimant testified that when he was required to visit a doctor in Greenville, Mississippi, he usually got his nephew or his sister to drive him. He stated that while he could drive short distances around town, longer trips caused him problems and that he was worried about his ability to safely drive for any significant distance. This testimony was corroborated by the claimant’s sister who noted that he had balance problems and that he was nervous about driving. We also note that the claimant received medical treatment from other physicians for vision and hearing problems which undoubtedly contributed to his limited driving abilities. [19] The claimant underwent a functional capacity evaluation on June 3, 1998. A report of that evaluation is in the Commission’s file and the therapist performing the evaluation, Mr. Rick Byrd, also provided testimony at the hearing. According to Mr. Byrd’s testimony, he was of the opinion that the claimant put forth a good effort in performing the evaluation. This assessment was based not only upon Mr. Byrd’s personal observation of the claimant but was also based upon the consistent results reported by the various testing apparatus Mr. Johnson worked with. According to Mr. Byrd, the claimant was only able to perform light work as termed by the United States Department of Labor. In reaching that conclusion, Mr. Byrd noted that the claimant exhibited significant deficits in his right upper extremity range of motion, including the elbow and the shoulder. He also stated that the claimant had severe muscle atrophy on his right side which substantially limited his right side strength and ability. He stated that the claimant demonstrated the ability to lift only 18 pounds with both hands with a limited range of motion. He noted similar problems in the claimant’s legs also noting an anatomical limitation on movement in his right knee. Mr. Byrd testified that the claimant’s knee would not move even if it was manually manipulated by him. Lastly, Mr. Byrd also observed that the claimant had decreased balance ability, walked with an impaired gait, and moved in a very slow paced manner. He stated that the claimant walked with a cane but performed the test without it. His conclusion was that the cane was used because of the claimant’s balance problem and observed that the claimant had difficulty walking on a balance beam and performing other tests of the claimant’s mobility. Finally, Mr. Byrd was of the opinion that the claimant exhibited a limited ability for fine manipulation with his hands presumably due to a significant amount of scarring on his fingers and hands. Mr. Byrd did recommend that the claimant attempt to increase his cardiovascular condition by walking or stationary cycling or some other activity approved by his treating physician. Mr. Bryd was of the opinion that the claimant’s physical condition had deteriorated because of his relative inactivity since his injury. [20] In discussing his past jobs, the claimant indicated that in his employments as a delivery truck driver, he was frequently required to load and unload his trucks and this was frequently performed outdoors. In fact, in his employment with the respondent employer, he delivered petroleum products which included pumping gasoline and other fuels into his truck from outside storage tanks. This required him to climb on top of his truck, occasionally on top of the storage tanks, and to use large and heavy hoses and similar equipment. [21] It is obvious to us, from reviewing the report of Mr. Byrd, the claimant is not capable of returning to his former employment as a truck driver. The respondent asserts in its brief that the claimant’s physician indicated that he could in fact return to such employment. However, in reviewing Dr. Love’s report to that effect, we note the doctor conditioned the claimant’s return to work on the fact that he would be able to work in an air-conditioned environment and one which allowed for his other physical limitations. As noted by the claimant in his testimony, very few delivery trucks are air conditioned and they require extensive shifting and other use of his hands, arms, and legs. We also note that the claimant did not complete high school although he does have a GED. Further, he does not seem to have any particular training or experience other than in the area of a truck driver. [22] The respondent arranged for the claimant to undergo a vocational assessment performed by Mr. Paul Hugen. Mr. Hugen apparently did not prepare a report for introduction as evidence, but did provide testimony at the trial. Mr. Hugen admitted that the claimant resided in a somewhat depressed economic area (McGee, Arkansas), and that the claimant’s job opportunities were limited. He also concurred with Mr. Byrd’s conclusion that the claimant would not be capable of working in a factory environment or any other job involving significant lifting, bending, stooping, or similar strenuous activity. [23] In his testimony, Mr. Hugen did identify four employment opportunities for the claimant. One of these was as a convenience store cashier in Monticello, Arkansas, a distance of approximately 35 miles from the claimant’s home. Mr. Hugen also mentioned that there was a job opening for a desk clerk at the Days Inn in Monticello, and a potential opportunity in a soon-to-be-open motel in the Monticello area. The other job identified by Mr. Hugen as being within the claimant’s restrictions was as a rental car driver in Greenville, Mississippi. Greenville, Mississippi was noted to be approximately 45 miles from the claimant’s residence. Mr. Hugen also stated that all of these jobs were minimum wage employment at approximately $5.00 per hour, with some of them only being part-time work. The only other opportunity mentioned by Mr. Hugen was as a part-time cashier at a Wal-Mart Store located near McGee. Mr. Hugen believed that the store would make accommodations for the claimant’s apparent limitations. [24] Since the claimant’s injury occurred prior to July 1, 1993, this claim is governed by the provisions of the workers’ compensation law as it existed prior to the amendments of Act 796 of 1993. Under Pre-Act law, when determining the degree of permanent disability sustained by an injured worker, the Commission must consider the degree to which the worker’s future wage-earning capacity is impaired. In addition to medical evidence demonstrating the degree to which the workers’ anatomical disabilities impair his earning capacity, the Commission must also consider other factors, such as the worker’s age, education, work experience, and any other matters which may affect the worker’s future earning capacity, including the degree of pain experienced by the worker. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-522 (1987); Tiller v. Sears, 27 Ark. App. 159, 767 S.W.2d 544 (1989). When it becomes evident that the worker’s underlying condition has become stable and that no further treatment will improve the condition, the disability is deemed to be permanent. If the employee is totally incapacitated from earning a livelihood at that time, he is entitled to compensation for permanent and total disability. Minor v.Poinsett Lumber Manufacturing Co., 235 Ark. 195, 357 S.W.2d 504
(1962). [25] Likewise, an employee who is injured to the extent that he can perform services that are so limited in quality, dependability, or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist may be classified as totally disabled under the odd-lot doctrine. Lewis v. Camelot Hotel, 35 Ark. App. 212, 816 S.W.2d 632 (1991). The odd-lot doctrine recognizes that the obvious severity of some injuries may combine with other factors to preclude the employee from obtaining employment in any reasonably stable market, although the employee is not altogether incapacitated from work. Id. In this regard, the factors which may combine with the obvious severity of the employee’s injury to place him in the odd-lot category are the employee’s mental capacity, education, training and age. Id. If the claimant makes a prima facie showing that he falls in the odd-lot category, the respondents have the burden of going forward with evidence showing that “some kind of suitable work is regularly and continuously available to the claimant.” Id. [26] In considering the factors which may affect an employee’s future earning capacity, we may consider the claimant’s motivation to return to work, since a lack of interest or a negative attitude impedes our assessment of the claimant’s loss of earning capacity.City of Fayetteville v. Guess, 10 Ark. App. 313, 663 S.W.2d 946
(1984); Oller v. Champion Parts Rebuilders, 5 Ark. App. 307, 635 S.W.2d 276 (1982). [27] In applying those considerations to the claimant’s present condition, there is no doubt that he has suffered a certain amount of disability as a result of his job related injuries. Both the functional capacities assessment as well as the opinion of the respondent’s vocational expert, leads us to conclude that the claimant is not capable of returning to his former employment as a truck driver. [28] However, the evidence does not convince us that the claimant fits within the odd-lot category or is totally disabled. The doctors restrictions only provided that he avoid exposure to heat and cold and that he should avoid activities which cause pain with his scars. These types of limitations would certainly not restrict the claimant from finding employment in a large number of light work occupations. [29] The claimant’s obvious lack of motivation to attempt to return to work impedes our ability to fully assess the claimant’s ability to return to work. While the fact that the claimant is presently receiving Social Security retirement benefits does not preclude him from receiving permanent and total benefits or wage loss benefits, it is clearly a factor that can be considered in assessing the effects of his injuries and his motivation to attempt to return to work. M.M. Cohn v. Haile, 267 Ark. 734, 589 S.W.2d 600 (Ark.App. 79); Curry v. Franklin Electric, 32 Ark. App. 168, 798 S.W.2d 130 (1990). [30] Lastly, we also believe that the claimant’s ability to return to work is hampered by other physical conditions which are unrelated to his compensable injury. For example, the claimant’s driving problems are mostly attributable to his vision loss, a condition which did not develop until after his job related accident. It is also noted by the therapist performing a functional capacity assessment that the claimant appeared to have a serious balance problem which, likewise, is a problem unassociated with his compensable injury. Clearly, the respondent is not liable for disability caused by conditions unrelated to the claimant’s compensable injury. [31] However, it cannot be denied that the claimant has clearly suffered a significant wage loss as a result of his injury. As indicated above, he is not able to return to his former employment as a truck driver, which had been the claimant’s primary occupation for many years. It is clear that the types of jobs for which the claimant could obtain employment would pay him significantly less than what he was able to earn in his past employments. [32] Having considered all of the evidence in this case, including that relating to the claimant’s age, education, past job experiences, the disabling effects of his compensable injury, lack of motivation, and other factors discussed above, it is our considered opinion that the claimant has suffered a wage loss in an amount equal to 55% to the body as a whole. When included with the 20% anatomical impairment previously accepted and paid by the respondent, this would result in a total disability to the claimant of 75%. [33] For the reasons set out above, we find that the administrative law judge was correct in holding that the present claim was not barred by the statute of limitations and that the claimant was entitled to benefits for facial disfigurement in addition to those benefits that he previously received for anatomical impairment. We likewise affirm the judge’s finding that the claimant is entitled to permanent disability benefits in addition to his anatomical impairment but we decline to affirm his award of permanent and total benefits. Instead, we find that the claimant has suffered wage loss in an amount equal to 55% to the body as a whole in addition to the 20% anatomical impairment previously accepted by the respondent. We likewise find that the respondent has controverted the claimant’s entitlement to the benefits awarded herein and that the claimant’s attorney is entitled to the maximum statutory fee on the additional benefits awarded herein. [34] All accrued benefits awarded herein shall be paid in a lump sum without discount, and this award shall bear interest at the maximum legal rate until paid. The claimant’s attorney is hereby awarded the maximum attorney’s fee for all benefits awarded herein pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-715, plus an additional fee of $250.00 for prevailing upon this appeal. One-half of this fee shall be paid by the respondent, with the balance to be paid by the claimant out of benefits he receives. [35] IT IS SO ORDERED. [36] ______________________________
ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman ______________________________ MIKE WILSON, Commissioner [36] Commissioner Humphrey concurs in part and dissents in part. [37] CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
[38] I concur in the findings that the statute of limitations is not a bar to claimant’s claim, and that he is entitled to benefits for facial disfigurement in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-514
(1987). However, I must respectfully dissent from the finding that claimant’s entitlement to permanent benefits totals 75%. [39] As with virtually all of the majority’s modifications on this issue, this decision represents a downward departure of the Administrative Law Judge’s award of permanent benefits. Claimant’s “obvious lack of motivation” and unrelated health problems are used to support the award modification. I cannot agree for in my view, claimant is permanently and totally disabled pursuant to the Odd Lot Doctrine. [40] On August 30, 1991, claimant was working for respondent employer as a bob truck driver. He transported fuel and oil to businesses as well as farms. The truck backfired, igniting the fuel. As a result, claimant sustained serious burns to his face, ears, arms and legs. The record is replete with photographs depicting the grisly burns claimant suffered. [41] Claimant was transported via ambulance to the hospital. He remained hospitalized for about three months. During that time, multiple debridement procedures were performed. For two years following his release from the hospital, claimant drove to Greenville so that the his wounds could be dressed anew. He stated he wore pressure garments, including a nylon facial mask and cloth sleeves on his arms, to protect his skin. [42] Claimant stated that Ms. Jenny Pye, an adjuster with Liberty Mutual, suggested that he pursue vocational rehabilitation. He agreed; however, Ms. Pye never broached the subject again. [43] Claimant acknowledged that he has not sought employment since his compensable injury. However, he explained that he is trained only as a truck driver, and was unable to return to work in that capacity. He stated that after working consistently for twenty-seven years, the decision to quit was based solely on his inability to work in his chosen occupation. With respect to driving, he explained that he has difficulty shifting gears as a result of the injuries to his upper extremities. Also, claimant stated that he could not perform the requisite climbing. Aside from the physical demands of the job, claimant explained that trucks are not air-conditioned. Thus, the job exceeded the restrictions imposed. [44] Rick Byrd, Exercise Physiologist, testified in behalf of claimant. He performed a FCE on June 3, 1998. He stated that the claimant showed balance deficits. Mr. Byrd indicated that claimant had difficulty with elbow extensions, lifting overhead, and performing activities below knee level. Claimant can neither squat nor kneel. [45] Byrd testified that he has performed job site analyses for truck drivers. He concluded that claimant is unable to do the requisite climbing to return to work as a truck driver. He stated that claimant would be suited for light work, which entailed lifting under twenty pounds. Within that category, claimant is further restricted since he is unable to reach overhead or perform repetitive squatting, lunging, and kneeling. Also, claimant was incapable of balance beam testing. Byrd stated that claimant exhibited difficulty performing tasks that required fine motor movement. Byrd characterized the reduction in claimant’s fine motor function as “significant.” [46] Paul Hugen, Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor, testified in behalf of respondents. He acknowledged that the labor market “was not great.” He stated that he found two separate jobs as a cashier that he believed claimant could perform. Also, he found two desk clerk positions, one of which was unavailable at the time of the hearing. Hugen stated that farm work was ruled out because it is classified as heavy labor. He acknowledged that claimant resides in an agricultural area. He eliminated factory work from consideration due to claimant’s dexterity deficits in his right hand. He stated that the job search was completed in two days because of time constraints. All of the positions pay minimum wage even though claimant was earning $6.00 per hour at the time of his injury in 1991. [47] On cross-examination, Hugen acknowledged that given the type of injury claimant sustained, offering vocational rehabilitation following the accident would have been a good strategy. He stated that claimant would have been a good vocational rehabilitation candidate several years ago. Hugen indicated that there is no documentation in his file showing that claimant was ever offered vocational rehabilitation. [48] Claimant was assigned an impairment rating of 20% to the whole body by Dr. Robert Love. Dr. Love explained that in addition to pain, claimant’s impairment rating was based upon his intolerance to temperature extremes. [49] The majority opinion noted that claimant’s FCE showed valid test results. Further, they determined that claimant cannot return to his former employment as a truck driver. Claimant’s educational level (GED secured) is mentioned in the majority opinion. Also, claimant’s lack of job skills and training are cited. However, the majority comments that “[t]he doctors restrictions only provided that he avoid exposure to heat and cold and that he should avoid activities which cause pain with his scars. These types of limitations would certainly not restrict the claimant from finding employment in a large number of light work occupations.” Then, the majority finds that “[t]he claimant’s obvious lack of motivation to attempt to return to work impedes our ability to fully assess the claimant’s ability to return to work.” [50] First, the majority cites no evidence to support their finding that there are many occupations within the light classification in which claimant may be employed. To the contrary, Mr. Byrd identified only four potential jobs. Moreover, there is no evidence that he ever mentioned claimant’s facial disfigurement. Given the fact that Byrd identified jobs in which claimant would have regular contact with the public, this is an important consideration. Although mindful of Dr. Love’s limited restrictions, I find that the FCE offered a more accurate assessment of claimant’s abilities. After reviewing the FCE, as well as the testimony of Mr. Byrd and Mr. Hugen, and considering claimant’s disfigurement, it is my opinion that claimant’s options are very limited. Even within the light work category, claimant has restrictions. [51] Moreover, I do not find that claimant has demonstrated an “obvious lack of motivation.” The majority concluded that he was unable to return to the only work he has ever performed. Claimant explained that he did not return to work following his medical release because he was unable to perform his job duties as a truck driver. Specifically, he stated he could neither lift hoses nor barrels as required in delivering fuel to businesses and farms. He also stated that his ability to drive is limited due to the injuries he sustained in the fire. Until the compensable accident, claimant worked consistently for twenty-seven years. He stated that he preferred working. He was initially released by Dr. Love in 1993; however, a FCE was not performed until the month before the hearing occurred. The labor market survey was hardly encouraging, as evidenced by the concession of Mr. Hugen that claimant’s prospects were not great. [52] At the hearing, counsel for respondents impugned claimant’s motivation, suggesting that vocational rehabilitation is of little value unless claimant is willing to return to work. No evidence at all was offered by respondents that claimant refused vocational rehabilitation. Indeed, the only evidence with respect to this issue was claimant’s testimony that after agreeing to participate in a rehabilitation evaluation, the adjuster never followed through. The FCE to ascertain claimant’s functional status was not conducted until the day of the pre-hearing conference. Claimant exhibited good effort, satisfying the validity criteria. In my view, it is the diligence of respondents that is suspect. In a chart note dated January 29, 1993, Dr. Love initially determined claimant had reached maximum medical improvement. Respondents’ witness, Mr. Hugen, testified that claimant would have been a good candidate for vocational rehabilitation. Respondents admitted liability in this case. Nevertheless, no steps were taken to assess claimant’s functional capabilities until 1998. [53] Claimant is sixty-six years old, with a GED. Following a fuel explosion, he sustained serious burns. He is unable to return to the only work he has ever performed. Claimant has dexterity deficits in his right hand. Although there are a multitude of factories in Southeast Arkansas, Mr. Hugen rejected this type of employment due to claimant’s right hand problems. He resides in an agricultural community. However, farm work exceeds claimant’s restrictions. The evidence shows that claimant’s job prospects are negligible based on his physical limitations alone. Coupled with his facial disfigurement, his job prospects are further reduced. Assuming, arguendo, that he is capable of some light duty employment, this does not preclude an odd-lot designation. I find that claimant is permanently and totally disabled by virtue of the Odd-Lot Doctrine. [54] As stated, the majority concludes that claimant’s limitations are attributable, in part, to medical conditions unrelated to his compensable injury. To support this line of reasoning, the majority points to the cataracts claimant developed subsequent to his injury in 1991. Thus, the majority finds that claimant’s driving difficulties “are mostly attributable to his vision loss.” Yet, claimant never mentioned his vision as a basis for his driving difficulties. To the contrary, he specifically stated that as a result of his upper extremity injuries, he had trouble shifting gears. Moreover, claimant had surgery to remove the cataracts, and indicated that he has no difficulty reading. Therefore, although I agree that evidence exists of other medical problems, I find that claimant’s compensable injuries alone support a finding of permanent and total disability. [55] Based on the foregoing, I respectfully dissent. _____________________________ PAT WEST HUMPHREY, Commissioner