CLAIM NO. E501750
Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED JUNE 13, 1996
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION, Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by CHARLES PADGHAM, Attorney at Law, Hot Springs, Arkansas.
Respondent represented by TOM DIAZ, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed.
[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] Claimant appeals from a decision of the Administrative Law Judge filed August 24, 1995, finding that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a compensable injury as that term is defined by Act 796 of 1993.
[6] While the claimant may have proven two specific incidents identifiable by time and place of occurrence, the record clearly shows that the claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a compensable injury established by medical evidence supported by objectivefindings. We have previously held that if a claimant fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence any of the requirements for establishing the compensability of the alleged injury, he fails to establish the compensability of the claim. Jerry D. Reed v. ConAgra Frozen Foods, FC Opinion filed Feb. 2, 1995 (E317244). [7] The record clearly reveals that the claimant was suffering from low back problems well before the October 27, 1994 incident. The claimant was being treated by Dr. Gocio from March, 1994 through October, 1994 for low back problems which were not in any way associated with his work. On September 20, 1994, one month prior to the first specific incident, the claimant was diagnosed with a herniated disc at L3-L4. Moreover, the claimant’s physical therapist noted on October, 1994 that “the patient states that this exacerbation of symptoms has been present for six weeks but hit a peak of intensity approximately one week ago. The patient states that his low back pain has commenced as a result of lifting a boat motor.” (JX-1, p. 51). [8] All objective medical evidence relied upon by the claimant was present prior to the claimant’s first incident on October 27, 1994. The claimant’s objective findings did not change after the October 27, 1994 incident. Claimant is apparently relying upon Dr. Gocio’s opinions that the claimant’s work activities were the major cause of the claimant’s low back condition and that his condition was aggravated due to the work activities. Dr. Gocio based this opinion largely upon the claimant’s reports and history. The Commission is not bound by a doctor’s opinion which is based largely on facts related to him by claimant where there is no sufficient independent knowledge upon which to corroborate claimant’s claim. Roberts v. Leo-Levi Hospital,8 Ark. App. 184, 649 S.W.2d 402 (1983). Moreover, when a medical opinion is clearly contradicted by the medical evidence, we have the authority to accept or reject such medical opinions. McClain v. Texaco, Inc., 29 Ark. Spp. 218, 780 S.W.2d 34 (1989). We find that Dr. Gocio’s opinion is contradicted by the objective medical findings which existed prior to the claimant’s work-related incident and is, therefore, entitled to no weight. [9] Accordingly, we find that the claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a compensable injury. Therefore, we find that the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed. [10] IT IS SO ORDERED.(1) proof by a preponderance of the evidence of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. (Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii) (Repl. 1996); Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(E)(ii) (Repl. 1996); Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401(a)(1);
(2) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body. (Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii) (Repl. 1996);
(3) medical evidence supported by objective findings, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16) (Repl. 1996), establishing the injury (Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(D) (Repl. 1996));
(4) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence (Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996));
JAMES W. DANIEL, Chairman ALICE L. HOLCOMB, Commissioner
[11] Commissioner Humphrey dissents.