MARTER v. FOAM, 1998 AWCC 139

CLAIM NO. E707682

CHARLES MARTER, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. DREW FOAM, EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT and WAUSAU INSURANCE CO., CARRIER, RESPONDENT

Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
ORDER FILED APRIL 6, 1998

Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Claimant appeared Pro Se.

Respondents represented by the HONORABLE MICHAEL E. RYBURN, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Vacated and remanded.

[1] ORDER
[2] The respondents appeal an opinion and order filed by the administrative law judge on November 4, 1997. In that opinion and order, the administrative law judge found that the claimant sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment on May 13, 1997. In addition, the administrative law judge found that the claimant was temporarily totally disabled for the period beginning May 15, 1997 and continuing through May 27, 1997. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that the decision of the administrative law judge must be vacated and this case remanded to the administrative law judge. [3] Since the claimant contends that he sustained an injury after July 1, 1993, this claim is controlled by the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Law as amended by Act 796 of 1993. Consequently, to establish the compensability of the claim, the claimant must satisfy the requirement for establishing one of the five categories of compensable injuries recognized by the amended law, including the requirements common to all categories of injuries.See, Jerry D. Reed v. Con Agra Frozen Foods, Full Workers’ Compensation Commission, opinion filed Feb. 2, 1995 (Claim No. E317744). Since the claimant in the present claim alleges that he sustained an injury as a result of a specific incident which is identifiable by time and place of occurrence, the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996) are controlling, and the following requirements must be satisfied:

(1) proof by a preponderance of the evidence of an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996); Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(E)(i) (Repl. 1996); see also, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1996));
(2) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body which required medical services or resulted in disability or death (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5) (A)(i) (Repl. 1996));
(3) medical evidence supported by objective findings, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16), establishing the injury (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(D) (Repl. 1996));
(4) proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence (see, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996)).

[4] If the claimant fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence any of the requirements for establishing the compensability of the injury alleged, he fails to establish the compensability of the claim, and compensation must be denied.Reed, supra. [5] In the present case, after summarizing various evidence in the record, and without specifically citing any of the four statutory requirements cited above, the administrative law judge performed the following analysis of the issues presented in this case:

It is therefore my opinion, after a thorough consideration of all of the evidence in this record, to include the testimony of the witness, a review of the medical reports, application of the appropriate statutory provisions, to include Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102, that the claimant has sustained his burden of proof by a preponderance of the credible evidence that he sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with respondent that (sic) on May 13, 1997, which resulted in the need for medical treatment on May 15, 1997, and a period of total incapacitation from engaging in gainful employment from May 15, 1997 through May 27, 1997. Respondents have controverted this claim in its entirety.

[6] In reviewing this analysis conducted by the administrative law judge, we are simply unable to ascertain on what evidentiary basis the administrative law judge concluded that the claimant has established by a preponderance of the evidence each of the four requirements indicated above. Moreover, we are unable to ascertain whether the administrative law judge has actually relied on the evidence cited in his November 4, 1997, decision, whether he has perhaps relied on other evidence in the record not cited in the November 4, 1997, opinion, or whether perhaps the administrative law judge has relied in part on evidence which was known to the administrative law judge but not submitted into the record in this case. [7] Because we are at a loss to ascertain on what evidentiary basis the administrative law judge concluded that the claimant has established by a preponderance of the evidence each of the four requirements necessary to establish the compensability of his injury, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision in this case should be vacated and remanded for more specific findings on the requirements necessary to establish compensability of the claimant’s injury. On remand, the administrative law judge is directed to cite any statutory standards and precedent relevant to the issues presented in this case. In addition, for each issue, the administrative law judge is directed to identify the evidence in the record relevant to his analysis on each requirement, and to specifically state the evidence basis for each requirement on which he has concluded that the claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence each of the four requirements necessary to establish the compensability of his alleged work-related injury. The administrative law judge is also directed to file his opinion and order containing the required findings within fifteen (15) days of the filing of this order. [8] IT IS SO ORDERED.

ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman MIKE WILSON, Commissioner

[9] Commissioner Humphrey concurs.