Attorney General of Arkansas — Opinion
STEVE CLARK, Attorney General
The Honorable Bill Clinton Governor Office of the Governor State Capitol Little Rock, Arkansas 72201
RE: Opinion Report
Dear Governor Clinton:
You have requested an opinion on the following issue:
Whether the Governor is required to personally sign extradition requests or may the Governor authorize the use of a signature machine to expedite the process.
There is no express authority for the use of a facsimile signature by the Governor on a document. However, a similar authority has been given certain state officials in Ark. Stat. Ann. Sections 12-2601 — 12-2606 (Repl. 1979).
One’s signature consists both of the act of writing one’s name and of the intention thereby to finally authenticate the instrument. Lee v. Vaughan Seed Store, 101 Ark. 68, 141, S.W. 496 (1911). The Supreme Court of Arkansas has stated that a directed signature, especially when duly acknowledged, is effective, Chipman v. Perdue, 135 Ark. 559, 205 S.W.2d 892 (1918) (claimant directed his son to sign claimant’s name to claim, and later claimant acknowledged and approved his signature), and printing, typing, or stamping a name, in the place where a personally written signature should appear, is sufficient so long as it is intended as a signature. See Ragge v. Bryan, 249 Ark. 164, 458 S.W.2d 403 (1979); Leach v. Bald Knob State Bank, 163 Ark. 91, 259 S.W. 3 (1924). See also Mayes v. State, 264 Ark. 283, 571 S.W.2d 420
(1978).
Also in support of the proposition that the Governor is not required to personally sign his name on every foreign or domestic extradition request submitted to the Governor’s Office is the analogous case of Hammond v. State, 244 Ark. 186, 424 S.W.2d 861, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 839 (1968), where the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the extradition of the defendant from Arkansas was not improper because the Governor of Arkansas had delegated to his agent and employee the responsibility for determining the validity of the extradition papers. Even though the extradition statutes are silent concerning the issue of whether the Governor must personally make the investigation of have it made by the Attorney General, Ark. Stat. Ann. Sections 43-3002, 43-3004, and 43-3007, the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated that it must be recognized that the Governor has “the right to rely on his agents or employees. . .” to do so. Hammond, 244 Ark. at 188.
In a case containing a somewhat analogous situation to this one, the Fourth Circuit stated that a document is not invalidated by the manner in which the signature is appended. Wheatley v. United States, 159 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1946) (the indictment was signed not by the U.S. Attorney but by one of his assistants who signed the name of the U.S. Attorney). (Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states, among other things, that an indictment or information shall be signed by the attorney for the government.) The Court in Wheatley stated that the signature of the attorney was necessary only as evidence of the authenticity of the document. See U.S. v. Keig, 334 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1964).
Extradition laws are not to be narrowly and technically construed as if they are penal laws, but should be liberally construed to the effect that their purpose — that each state must reach across its borders and bring a fugitive to a speedy trial — would be obtained without unreasonable delay. Cadle Pierce v. Cauthron, Sheriff, 266 Ark. 419, 426, 584 S.W.2d 6 (1979).
The answer to your question, then, is that, in line with the speedy trial objective of the extradition laws and for the above-cited reasons, the authorized use of your signature machine, instead of your personal signature, is valid regarding extradition requests. Since you review each request and authorize your signature, the legal effect would be the same as if you actually signed the document.
This opinion, which I hereby approve, was prepared by Assistant Attorney General Lee Taylor Franke.