CLAIM NO. E505773
MARVIN SNUGGS, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. GRIFFIN ELECTRIC HEATING AIR, UNINSURED EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT
Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED NOVEMBER 17, 1997
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE DAVID H. McCORMICK, Attorney at Law, Russellville, Arkansas and the HONORABLE JONATHAN P. SHERMER, JR., Attorney at Law, Russellville, Arkansas.
Respondent represented by the HONORABLE WALTER MURRAY, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Vacated in part, reversed in part, and affirmed in part.
[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] Appeals in this case were filed by both parties in regard to two separate orders entered by the administrative law judge. The first of these orders was titled interim order and was dated March 21, 1997. The second of these orders was dated June 30, 1997. After conducting a de novo review of all the evidence contained in the record, we find that the administrative law judge’s order of June 30, 1997, should be vacated and set aside. In addition, we find that the administrative law judge’s order of March 21, 1997, should be reversed in part and affirmed in part.
[3] This case concerns the entitlement of certain individuals to dependency benefits based upon the death of Marvin Snuggs on September 27, 1993. At the time of the fatal accident, the respondent employer was uninsured. The accident has been accepted as compensable.
[4] The only witness to testify at the hearing was Debbie Snuggs. Ms. Snuggs testified that she became acquainted with the claimant in October 1989. She went on to testify that he fathered a child by her which was born in July 1990. This child was named Sarah. Subsequently, Ms. Snuggs testified that she and the decedent were married in April 1991, and a second child (Brittany) was born to them in January 1993.
[5] It was also developed during the hearing that the deceased claimant had four children by a prior marriage. One of those children, who was apparently over 18 at the time of the decedent’s death, was residing with him. The other three lived with his former wife and the decedent was apparently paying child support to her pursuant to a Faulkner County Chancery Court decree. However, no claim has been filed on behalf of these children nor have they entered an appearance in this case.
[6] Debbie Snuggs also testified that, at the time of the decedent’s fatal accident, they had separated. However, according to Ms. Snuggs, the separation was in fact a sham and was done merely to permit her to obtain additional food stamps, AFDC, subsidized rent, and other welfare benefits. Ms. Snuggs stated that the decedent continued to take meals at her apartment, spent most, if not all, nights there, and provided monetary support to her and their children.
[7] Ms. Snuggs asserted that she met the decedent while she was in jail awaiting trial on felony drug charges, and he was serving time for failure to pay child support. Ms. Snuggs testified that she was incarcerated with the Arkansas Department of Corrections in June of 1990. Apparently, her daughter Sarah was conceived while she was out on bond previous to that time, and the child was born while she was in prison. According to Ms. Snuggs, she married the claimant approximately one month after she was released from imprisonment.
[8] After the hearing was conducted, this case became somewhat confused procedurally. The hearing in this case was held on March 21, 1997. On March 31, 1997, the administrative law judge entered an order which she titled “Interim Order and Opinion.” In that order, it was found that the testimony of Debbie Snuggs was sufficiently credible to establish that Sarah and Brittany Snuggs were the children of the decedent and were actually dependent upon him at the time of his death. However, the administrative law judge further held that Ms. Snuggs’ testimony was not sufficiently credible to establish that Ms. Snuggs was the decedent’s dependent. The interim order also stated that the decedent apparently had other minor dependents in addition to Sarah and Brittany Snuggs, and requested Debbie Snuggs or Kyra Snuggs, the decedent’s adult daughter, to assist in locating the other children.
[9] After receiving the interim order, the respondent appealed the finding that Sarah and Brittany were the children of the decedent and were actually dependent upon him. The respondent also appealed the administrative law judge’s action in apparently reopening the record so that additional evidence could be admitted regarding the existence of minor dependents other than Sarah and Brittany Snuggs. The claimant appealed the finding in the interim order that Debbie Snuggs was not entitled to dependent benefits.
[10] In a letter to the administrative law judge dated May 16, 1997, the claimant’s attorney stated that he had made contact with the decedent’s ex-wife and stated that the decedent did in fact have three minor children for which he was obligated to provide support pursuant to a previous court decree. The claimant’s attorney attached a copy of that decree with his letter. Subsequent to the receipt of this letter, the administrative law judge wrote to the respondent’s attorney on May 19, 1997, requesting that he advise her if he wanted to undertake any additional discovery or hold a subsequent hearing as a result of the claimant’s attorney’s letter of May 16, 1997. In a letter dated May 30, 1997, the respondent’s attorney wrote to the administrative law judge indicating that the respondent did not desire to conduct any additional discovery or hold a second hearing.
[11] On June 30, 1997, the administrative law judge entered a second order that was apparently intended to be the final order in the case. In this order, the administrative law judge reiterated her findings that the decedent was the father of Sarah and Brittany Snuggs and had been actually supporting them prior to his death but that Debbie Snuggs did not prove that she was actually dependent upon the deceased. The order also found that the decedent’s minor children from his first marriage were also entitled to dependency benefits. The order required the “claimant” to provide the respondent with the children’s birth certificates. The administrative law judge also found that the decedent’s average weekly wage was $298.61 based upon an average of the total wages the claimant was paid during his nine full weeks of employment with the respondent.
[12] Resolution of the procedural question in this case is difficult. It appears from our review of the pleadings that the interim order of March 31, 1997, was probably not intended to be a final, appealable order. Nonetheless, the administrative law judge did make a final adjudication as to the rights and obligations of the parties, and both parties filed appeals to that order. Both the claimant and the respondent had filed briefs prior to the entry of the administrative law judge’s June 30, 1997 order. After the entry of the June 30th order, the respondent’s attorney obtained an extension to file a reply brief in which he, once again, objected to the administrative law judge allowing additional information to be entered after the hearing. The brief also argues that the administrative law judge lacks the authority or jurisdiction to enter an order in the case while her previous order in the case was on appeal before the Full Commission.
[13] The case is further complicated by the fact that the administrative law judge in her order of June 30, 1997, awarded benefits to the minor children of the deceased’s prior marriage, even though none of those persons had ever entered an appearance in the case. Also, there is nothing in the record to indicate where these children reside, their ages, or any other information regarding them. The divorce decree that was attached to the letter from claimant’s attorney dated May 16, 1997, does indicate that Mr. Marvin Snuggs (presumably the deceased) had three minor children in July 1990. However, the decree does not indicate the ages of the children at that time and, consequently, there is no evidence in the record to indicate which of those children, if any, were minors at the time of the decedent’s death.
[14] In our opinion, regardless of the intent of the administrative law judge, the order of March 21, 1997, was a final appealable order. From that decision, both parties filed appeals. Once the Notices of Appeals were filed, the Commission was vested with the subject matter jurisdiction of this claim, and the administrative law judge did not have the authority to continue entering orders and conducting proceedings in this case until the Commission had ruled on the appeal. For reasons that are not entirely clear, the administrative law judge apparently decided to continue to enter orders and adjudicate the case, even though the case was on appeal to the Full Commission.
[15] We find that the order of June 30, 1997, should be set aside. The order was entered while the administrative law judge’s previous order was on appeal, and that appeal had not yet been decided. Obviously, the circumstances upon which the June 30th order was entered could be substantially changed based upon the Commission’s decision in regard to the March 21st, order. Likewise, we find that the claimant’s attorney’s letter of May 16, 1997, also should not be made part of the record on appeal since it is in fact an admission of evidence obtained almost two months after the record at the hearing had been closed. In that regard, we note that the hearing record was not left open for the admission of later evidence.
[16] Since we are hereby vacating the order of June 30, 1997, the administrative law judge’s order of March 21, 1997, becomes the final order in this case. In that order, the administrative law judge found that the claimant’s average weekly wage at the time of his death was $298.61. Since neither of the parties have appealed that portion of the administrative law judge’s decision, we hereby affirm that finding. The balance of the opinion dealt with the question of the entitlement to dependency benefits of Ms. Debbie Snuggs and her two minor children, Sarah and Brittany Snuggs.
[17] As indicated above, Ms. Debbie Snuggs was the only witness to testify at the hearing in this case. Ms. Snuggs stated that she had married the decedent in April of 1991, and that he had fathered both Sarah and Brittany Snuggs. In denying the claim for dependency benefits of Debbie Snuggs, the administrative law judge was of the opinion that Debbie Snuggs was not a credible witness. There is ample basis for reaching that conclusion.
[18] Ms. Snuggs admitted that she had been convicted of four felony drug offenses on two separate occasions. She also testified that as a result of her second set of convictions, she had been incarcerated with the Arkansas Department of Corrections from June 1990 through March 1991. Ms. Snuggs also admitted during her testimony that she had entered into a sham separation with Marvin Snuggs for the obvious purpose of fraudulently obtaining welfare benefits. It appears to us, that if Ms. Snuggs was willing to lie to obtain welfare benefits, she would almost certainly be willing to lie to obtain workers’ compensation benefits. We also note that Ms. Snuggs did not offer into evidence a copy of her marriage license or any other documentation establishing that she was ever married at any time to the decedent. For those reasons, we find that Ms. Snuggs’ testimony should be afforded very little weight and is not sufficient to establish that she was either the widow of the deceased nor that she was actually dependent upon him at the time of his death.
[19] The administrative law judge did find that the testimony of Ms. Snuggs was sufficiently credible to establish that Sarah and Brittany Snuggs were his children. In our opinion, this result is inconsistent with the administrative law judge’s findings that Ms. Snuggs was not a credible witness. The only evidence offered to establish that Sarah and Brittany Snuggs were the children of the decedent was Ms. Snuggs’ testimony. Once again, no birth records or other documents were offered into evidence reflecting that Mr. Snuggs was their parent. If Ms. Snuggs’ testimony is not sufficiently credible to establish her entitlement to benefits, we do not see how it can be found to be sufficiently credible to establish that her children were also the dependents of Mr. Snuggs. We therefore find that the testimony of Debbie Snuggs is not sufficiently credible to establish either her or her children were the dependents of Mr. Snuggs or were entitled to benefits as a result of his death.
[20] Even though we are finding that there was insufficient evidence presented at the hearing in this case to establish that Debbie Snuggs or her children, Sarah and Brittany Snuggs, are entitled to dependency benefits, we do note that there was some evidence produced at the hearing indicating the decedent may have had minor children by a prior marriage. However, since there has been no claim filed on behalf of those children, and their entitlement to dependency benefits has at no time been made an issue in this case, we are not making any determination as to their entitlement to benefits and any such decisions in that regard are hereby held in abeyance until such time as that matter is properly brought before us.
[21] In order to assure that all potential dependents in this case have been properly advised as to the death of the claimant, and their possible entitlement to benefits based upon his job related injury, we are hereby directing the respondent to contact any potential dependents which they may be aware of, including those referred to in the hearing of this case, as well as any other potential dependents, and to advise them as to the claimant’s death and their potential entitlement to dependency benefits. In the event that the respondent does not believe that such potential dependents are entitled to dependency benefits, they are further directed to advise such persons as to their potential rights to these benefits and to advise them that they may contact the Workers’ Compensation Commission to determine what steps they can take to enforce their potential rights. The respondent is hereby specifically ordered to provide this information to these persons by personal service, or some other method in which it can be verified that these children as well as their parent or guardian have been advised, according to the directions set out above. Lastly, the respondent is specifically directed to provide to the Commission evidence that they have complied with our directive herein within thirty (30) days of the date which this order becomes final.
[22] For the reasons set out above and after a de novo review of all the evidence contained in the record, we find that the administrative law judge’s order of June 30, 1997, should be set aside and vacated and held for naught. We also find that the administrative law judge’s finding in her March 21, 1997, order to the effect that the claimant’s average weekly wage was $298.61, should be affirmed. We also hold that Debbie Snuggs, Sarah Snuggs, and Brittany Snuggs failed to establish their entitlement to dependency benefits pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act. Lastly, the respondent is hereby directed to provide a notice in accordance with the terms set out above, to all potential dependents of the decedent including, but not limited to, such persons mentioned in the previously held hearing, and to provide confirmation to the Commission that such a notice has been actually provided to them within thirty (30) days of the date this order becomes final.
[23] IT IS SO ORDERED.
ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman MIKE WILSON, Commissioner
[24] Commissioner Humphrey concurs.
