CLAIM NO. E602248
WILLIAM WEST, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. FLUOR DANIEL, EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT and PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE CO., CARRIER, RESPONDENT
Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED DECEMBER 4, 1997
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION, Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by HENRY BOYCE, Attorney at Law, Newport, Arkansas.
Respondent represented by RICHARD LUSBY, Attorney at Law, Jonesboro, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Reversed.
[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] Respondent appeals from a decision of the Administrative Law Judge filed February 21, 1997 finding that claimant sustained a compensable injury supported by objective medical findings. Based upon our de novo review of the entire record, we find that claimant has failed to present medical evidence supported by objective findings to substantiate his claim. Therefore, we find that the decision of the Administrative law Judge should be reversed.
[3] Claimant contends that on November 29, 1995, he struck his elbow on a piece of pipe resulting in a compensable injury. After receiving medical treatment which failed to elicit any objective medical findings, respondent controverted claimant’s injury.
[4] The claimant’s injury occurred after July 1, 1993, thus, this claim is governed by the provisions of
Act 796 of 1993. We have held that in order to establish compensability of an injury, a claimant must satisfy all the requirements set forth in Ark. Code Ann. §
11-9-102 as amended by Act 796. Jerry D. Reed v. ConAgraFrozen Foods, FC Opinion filed Feb. 2, 1995 (
E317744). When a claimant alleges that he sustained an injury as a result of a specific incident, identifiable by time and place of occurrence, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained an accidental injury causing internal or external harm to the body which arose out of and in the course of his employment and which required medical services or resulted in disability or death. See Ark. Code Ann. §
11-9-102(5)(A)(i) and §
11-9-102(5)(E)(i) (Repl. 1996). He must also prove that the injury was caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. See Ark. Code Ann. §
11-9-102(5)(A)(i). Finally, Ark. Code Ann. §
11-9-102(5)(D) requires that a claimant must establish a compensable injury “by medical evidence supported by `objective findings’ as defined in §
11-9-102(16).”
[5] If the claimant fails to establish by a preponderance of the credible evidence any of the requirements for establishing the compensability of the injury, he fails to establish the compensability of the claim, and compensation must be denied.Jerry D. Reed, supra.
[6] Even assuming that claimant has met the other requirements for proving a compensable injury, claimant has failed to present medical evidence supported by objective findings substantiating his claim. All medical evaluations have only revealed pain or tenderness about claimant’s lateral epicondylar area of his elbow. In his deposition taken on January 7, 1997, Dr. William T. Shanlever confirmed that the diagnosis is not supported by objective findings. Dr. Shanlever testified that the x-rays of claimant’s arm revealed no objective findings. In addition, Dr. Shanlever testified that his diagnosis was based upon the claimant’s account of pain and tenderness during the evaluation. There was much discussion whether claimant’s withdrawal of his arm from the physician during the examination was a voluntary or involuntary finding. Dr. Shanlever testified that claimant’s removal of his arm as a result of pain during the examination was a voluntary action on behalf of claimant, although Dr. Shanlever testified that he could not determine whether the removal of the arm was a conscious movement or not.
[7] Ark. Code Ann. §
11-9-102(16) defines objective findings as”those findings which cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient.” It is clear when all medical evidence introduced in this case is reviewed that there are no objective findings substantiating claimant’s injury. Claimant has been diagnosed with pain and tenderness about his elbow and has been diagnosed with “tennis elbow.” Although the medical records refer to this condition as epicondylitis which is defined as “inflammation of the epicondyle or of the tissues adjoining the epicondyle of the humerus,” there is no finding in the medical records nor is there any testimony in Dr. Shanlever’s deposition regarding inflammation of claimant’s epicondyle or elbow. The only finding and diagnosis has been that of pain. However, Epicondylalgia is defined inDorland’s Medical Dictionary as “pain in the muscles or tendons attached to the epicondyle of the humerus; see also tennis elbow, under elbow.” (Emphasis added.) In our opinion, pain and inflammation are not synonymous. Merely because claimant has been diagnosed with pain and tenderness does not equate to a finding of inflammation. Based upon the evidence in the record, we cannot find that claimant suffers from inflammation of the epicondyle as opposed to mere pain or tenderness in that area. Therefore, we cannot agree with the Administrative Law Judge that the diagnosis implies a finding of inflammation. Accordingly, we find that claimant has failed to prove the compensability of his claim by objective medical findings. Therefore, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is reversed.
[8] IT IS SO ORDERED.
ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman MIKE WILSON, Commissioner
[9] Commissioner Humphrey dissents.
