CLAIM NOS. E507963 and E507964
JUDITH A. WRIGHT, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN, EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT NO. 1 and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., INSURANCE CARRIER, RESPONDENT NO. 1 and COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE CO., INSURANCE CARRIER, RESPONDENT NO. 2
Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED APRIL 28, 1997
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by the HONORABLE FREDERICK S. “RICK” SPENCER, Attorney at Law, Mountain Home, Arkansas.
Respondents No. 1 represented by the HONORABLE J. ROBIN NIX, II, Attorney at Law, Jonesboro, Arkansas.
Respondent No. 2 represented by the HONORABLE PETER O. THOMAS, JR., Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed.
[1] OPINION AND ORDER
[2] The claimant has appealed a decision of an administrative law judge dated August 20, 1996. In that decision, the administrative law judge held that the claimant did not establish her entitlement to any additional medical or indemnity benefits resulting from her arm injury. The administrative law judge also found that the injuries to the claimant’s feet were not the result of rapid and repetitive motion and was therefore not compensable. Lastly, the administrative law judge found that any need for psychological treatment the claimant had was not the result of any job related activities or injuries. After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, we find that the administrative law judge’s decision must be affirmed.
[3] The claimant has alleged that she suffered a specific incident injury to her right arm when she fell in October of 1993. She stated that when she fell, her forearm came in contact with a hot water dispenser causing a bruise and burn to that area of her arm. The claimant testified that she did not seek medical attention for this injury until January, 1994. The claimant further testified that her arm never completely healed and that at the time of the hearing she had numbness and loss of sensation in her arm. The claimant also alleged that while employed by the respondent, she developed plantar fascitis with tarsal tunnel syndrome. She also alleges that problems dealing with these conditions forced her to seek psychological treatment. The claimant testified that she eventually left the respondent in April 1994 because of the increased pain in her feet. The respondent contends that the claimant’s arm injury is either not compensable or, alternatively, that there is insufficient evidence to support an award of benefits. Respondent also contends that any problem with the claimant’s feet preexisted her employment with the respondent and that any medical care the claimant has received is required by the respondent. Alternatively, the respondents also contend that any injuries to her feet that may have occurred while employed by them do not meet the requirements of a nonspecific injury as required by Ark. Code Ann. §
11-9-102 (5)(A)(ii)(a). Lastly, the respondents contend that the claimant’s need for psychological treatment or counseling is from problems totally unrelated to any psychological overlay from her employment activities.
[4] We find that the claimant failed to establish any causal connection between her need for psychological treatment or counseling and any aspect of her employment. Her psychological condition was set out in a report from Dr. Douglas Stevens, a clinical psychologist, dated January 10, 1995. In that report, Dr. Stevens diagnosed the claimant as suffering from depression, post traumatic stress disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. Dr. Stevens did not relate these problems with her employment. On the other hand, he did note a connection between the claimant’s problems and her history of physical abuse by her first husband and her father.
[5] The claimant testified that she had not been suffering from depression and related disorders until her employment with the respondent. However, this testimony is contradicted by the claimant’s admission that prior to moving to Mountain Home and going to work for the respondent, she was taking Pamelor, Elavil, and Diazepam, medications for depression and anxiety disorders. Clearly, the claimant was undergoing psychological treatment prior to her alleged injury. Her present complaints do not appear to be any different than those which she was being treated for prior to her employment with the respondent. We find that any need for such treatments predates the claimant’s alleged injury and is not the result of any job-related accident or condition.
[6] The next issue presented here is the question of the compensability of the injury to the claimant’s arm. The only evidence supporting the occurrence of this event is the testimony of the claimant herself. The limited testimony in the record regarding this event indicates that the claimant suffered a very minor injury as a result of falling and striking her arm against a hot water dispenser, sometime during October 1994. The claimant testified that sometime after this incident, she began developing numbness in her arm. She attributed this numbness to the fall in October of 1994.
[7] The claimant has not offered any evidence that would establish a causal relationship between her alleged fall and the numbness she claims to be suffering from. It is significant that the claimant did not seek any medical care for this condition for approximately three months after the date of her alleged injury. We also note that Ark. Code Ann. §
11-9-102 (5)(D) requires that a compensable injury be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. The claimant has not offered any medical evidence to support the existence of any numbness or other muscular, skeletal, or neurological defects in her arm. We also find that her testimony is not sufficiently credible to establish the occurrence of any event that resulted in the condition she claims to be suffering from. For those reasons, her claim for any benefits resulting from her alleged arm injury is denied and dismissed.
[8] We also find that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she has sustained a compensable injury to either foot. The claimant does not assert that her foot problems were caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Instead, the claimant testified that her feet began bothering her because she was required to remain standing during her entire shift and to rapidly walk from one part of the restaurant to another in order to carry out her job-related tasks. However, we find that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any work-related injury was the major cause of her alleged foot problems. In this regard, the claimant testified that prior to being employed by the respondent, she had suffered problems from her feet. The claimant also indicated that, before moving to the Mountain Home area, she had been living in Magnolia, and did not own an automobile. Consequently, the claimant walked in excess of one mile to her employments at a nursing home and a restaurant. Upon arriving at these locations, the claimant would spend most of her eight-hour shift on her feet. In fact, in his report of January 10, 1995, Dr. Stevens noted that the claimant’s feet had gradually broken down about six years ago when she was walking a mile to and from work and then standing for eight hours.
[9] We also find that the claimant failed to establish her alleged foot injuries with objective medical evidence. In this regard, the only medical report containing a clear discussion of the condition of the claimant’s feet is a report by Dr. Donald Fonte, an orthopedist, in Mountain Home, Arkansas. In that report, Dr. Fonte stated that Dr. Richard Caul, a podiatrist, had diagnosed her as having plantar fascitis in April 1994. However, Dr. Fonte noted that he did not detect any posterior tenderness, bony prominence, or reddening around the claimant’s heal area. While he stated that Dr. Caul had apparently “reviewed x-rays of the claimant’s feet,” Dr. Fonte did not conduct any x-rays or other diagnostic tests on his own. Therefore, other than the claimant’s descriptions of her symptoms, there is no evidence of her condition’s existence, objective or otherwise.
[10] Moreover, in order to establish the compensability of a nonspecific injury, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury did arise out of and in the course of her employment; the injury must have caused internal or external physical harm to the body; the injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings; the injury must have been caused by rapid and repetitive motion; and the injury must have been the major cause of the claimant’s disability or need for treatment. We find that the claimant did not offer sufficient evidence to satisfy any of the above requirements.
[11] For the reasons set out above, we find that the claimant failed to establish the occurrence of any compensable injuries during her employment with the respondent. Therefore, we find that the decision of the administrative law judge must be, and hereby is, affirmed.
[12] IT IS SO ORDERED.
ELDON COFFMAN, Chairman MIKE WILSON, Commissioner
[13] Commissioner Humphrey dissents.
