YOUNT v. AUTOZONE, INC., 2000 AWCC 16


CLAIM NO. E800539

CHARLES EDWARD YOUNT, II, EMPLOYEE, CLAIMANT v. AUTOZONE, INC., EMPLOYER, RESPONDENT, EMPLOYERS and INSURANCE OF WAUSAU, INSURANCE CARRIER, RESPONDENT

Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission
OPINION FILED JANUARY 14, 2000

Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Claimant represented by DANIEL E. WREN, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Respondents represented by ERIC NEWKIRK, Attorney at Law, West Memphis, Arkansas.

Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Affirmed.

OPINION AND ORDER
[1] Respondents appeal a June 29, 1999 opinion of an Administrative Law Judge finding that the MRI scan recommended by Dr. Chu, claimant’s treating physician, is reasonably necessary for the treatment of claimant’s compensable lower back injury.

[2] Employers must promptly provide medical services which are reasonably necessary for treatment of compensable injuries. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-508(a) (Repl. 1996). However, injured employees have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that medical treatment is reasonably necessary for treatment of the compensable injury. Norma Beatty v. Ben Pearson, Inc., Full Commission Opinion filed February 17, 1989 (D612291). In assessing whether a given medical procedure is reasonably necessary for treatment of the compensable injury, we analyze both the proposed procedure and the condition it is sought to remedy. Deborah Jones v.Seba, Inc., Full Commission Opinion filed December 13, 1989 (D512553).

[3] On January 12, 1998, claimant sustained an admittedly compensable injury to his lower back while lifting a case of motor oil. Claimant immediately informed the employer of his injury and the employer promptly directed claimant to Dr. Victor S. Chu for medical care. Muscle spasms and tenderness were observed and a diagnosis was made of musculoskeletal back pain. Eventually physical therapy was prescribed and on February 16, 1998, Dr. Chu released claimant to light duty with a 35 pound lifting restriction for one week and thereafter allowed claimant to return to full duty. Claimant saw Dr. Chu on March 16 and was referred for trigger point injections, which were administered on March 26. The injections were of no real benefit to claimant. On March 31, 1998, Dr. Chu recommended an MRI scan to further delineate the extent and nature of claimant’s condition and to determine any need for more aggressive treatment modalities. At this point, respondent controverted any additional benefits contending that claimant’s injuries were the result of him either installing a clutch in an automobile or laying carpet after hours sometime in March.

[4] Claimant presented credible testimony that after he was released to full duty he had good days and bad days. He explained that his condition would worsen intermittently for no apparent reason. Claimant denied suffering any additional incidents or any increase in back pain following his activities working on the clutch or laying carpet. The record indicates that claimant actually did very little of a strenuous nature during either of these outside activities. It would be pure speculation to attribute claimant’s continued back problems to these nonwork-related activities. We find that claimant’s worsening back condition is causally related to the original compensable injury and therefore, respondent remains liable for compensation benefits. An MRI scan to help delineate the extent and nature of claimant’s condition is certainly a reasonable and necessary procedure at this point in treatment for the injury.

[5] Accordingly, we affirm the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge finding that claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the MRI scan recommended by his treating physician is reasonably necessary for the treatment of the compensable injury. For prevailing on this appeal to the Full Commission, claimant’s attorney is hereby awarded an additional attorney’s fee in the amount of $250.00.

[6] IT IS SO ORDER.

[7] _______________________________
PAT WEST HUMPHREY, Commissioner

[8] Chairman Coffman concurs.

CONCURRING OPINION
[9] I concur in the principal opinion’s findings. I write separately to address the dissent’s suggestion that the claimant’s work-related back injury resolved prior to Dr. Chu ordering an MRI in March of 1998, and that the claimant’s present need for medical treatment is caused by subsequent activities away from work.

[10] First, I point out that no where in the medical record did Dr. Chu, or any other physician, ever indicate that the claimant’s work-related back injury ever resolved prior to Dr. Chu ordering an MRI in March of 1998. Second, to the extent that it has been suggested that the claimant engaged in lifting transmissions or heavy automotive repair work, the record fails to show that the claimant engaged in these activities. In fact, the deposition testimony of the claimant, of Benjamin Henry Crow, Jr., and of Kent Rudelis indicate that the apparent basis for the insurance adjuster’s refusal to approve the MRI scan was, in fact, inaccurate.

[11] Moreover, while the claimant did perform automotive repair work after the date of his injury, he did not do so during the period he was taken “off work” or under restrictions from his treating physician. Instead, he attempted to return to his pre-injury activities only after completing his prescribed rest, medication, physical therapy and light-duty employment restrictions, and having been released to full duty without restrictions.

[12] In short, the greater weight of the evidence indicates that the adjuster was mis-informed about the claimant’s post-injury activities, that the claimant did not engage in any prohibited activities after his injury, and that the claimant has experienced persistent back problems that never resolved from his work-related back injury. Consequently, I concur that an MRI is reasonably necessary for treatment of the claimant’s work-related injury.

[13] ______________________________ ELDON F. COFFMAN, Chairman

[14] Commissioner Wilson dissents.

DISSENTING OPINION
[15] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. The respondents appeal a decision by the Administrative Law Judge finding that an MRI recommended by Dr. Chu was reasonable and necessary medical treatment. Based upon my de novo review of the record, the claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof.

[16] Claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the credible evidence that medical treatment is reasonable and necessary. Norma Beatty v. Ben Pearson, Inc., Full Commission Opinion, Feb. 17, 1989 (D612291); B.R. Hollingshead v. ColsonCaster, Full Commission Opinion, Aug. 27, 1993 (D703346). Employers are only liable for medical treatment and services which are deemed reasonably necessary for the treatment of employees’ injuries. DeBoard v. Colson Co., 20 Ark. App. 166, 725 S.W.2d 857
(1987). In workers’ compensation cases, the burden rests upon the claimant to establish his claim for compensation by a preponderance of the evidence. Kuhn v. Majestic Hotel, 50 Ark. App. 23, 899 S.W.2d 845 (1995); Bartlett v. Mead Container Board, 47 Ark. App. 181, 888 S.W.2d 314 (1994). When assessing whether medical treatment is reasonably necessary for the treatment of a compensable injury, we must analyze both the proposed procedure and the condition it is sought to remedy. Deborah Jones v. Seba,Inc., Full Commission Opinion, Dec. 13, 1989 (D512553).

[17] The evidence indicates that the claimant was released to return to full-duty work one week after February 16, 1998. After he was released to full-duty, the claimant was able to engage in off-duty work as a mechanic, an occupation which he had been engaging in prior to his injury of January 12, 1998. At some point in March of 1998, the claimant performed work on a vehicle owned by Kent Rudelis. The claimant testified that he was capable of performing his job duties at Auto Zone as well as engaging in his off-duty work as a mechanic. At the time that the work was performed on Mr. Rudelis’ vehicle, the claimant was required to remove the transmission to replace a clutch. This took approximately 8 hours and is very strenuous work. The claimant confessed that the job he performed for Mr. Rudelis was “the hardest thing that I did during that time.”

[18] In March of 1998 the claimant was also able to assist his father and his cousin installing carpet. The claimant laid the tag strip around the interior of the house which required the claimant to lay carpet and hammer nails. The claimant also testified that he laid some padding, picked up scraps, and threw the scraps in the trash.

[19] In my opinion, the claimant has not shown that the need for the MRI was a result of his January 12, 1998, compensable injury. The claimant was engaging in other off-duty activities that could have led to his continuing need for medical treatment. The claimant was able to perform off-duty mechanic work as well as lay carpet.

[20] Therefore, I find that the MRI was not reasonable and necessary medical treatment. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

[21] ______________________________ MIKE WILSON, Commissioner